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The relation of private law to the state is one of the most complex aspects of the challenges 
posed for the law by Europeanization and globalization. It is not only distinct from that be-
tween public law and the state; it is also not the same in different legal systems. This article 
provides a historical and comparative overview of this relation in Germany and in the United 
States. It analyses the historical conditions and reasons for which the state became the ulti-
mate source of authority for private law in Europe but remained largely without importance 
for doctrinal discussions and jurisprudential decisions within private law. It also identifies 
some factors that can explain largely different developments in the United States, where, de-
spite the conceptual absence of the state within private law, private law was never seen to the 
same degree as autonomous from social policy. On the basis of these comparative and his-
torical observations, the article concludes with more general, theoretical remarks on some of 
the problems that may be seen as core aspects of the relation of private law and the state. 
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Everyone is talking about the challenges that Europeanization and globalization pose for the 
law, including private law. Yet there is remarkably little conceptual clarity about exactly what 
these challenges consist of. To a significant degree, such developments appear to concern the 
relation between private law and the state. Yet, although the general relation between law and 
the state is a regular topic for legal theory, the specificities of private law are often lost. Even 
cursory analysis suggests, however, that the relation of private law to the state is not only 
highly complex and distinct, it is also, apparently, not the same in different legal systems. 
Nevertheless, it has not yet been comprehensively analysed; in fact, little is known of how 
private law relates to the state in any single legal system. 
 This article, together with a companion piece1, aims to shed light on some of the is-
sues involved. Of course, the manifold relations between private law and the state are far too 
complex to be analysed comprehensively in a single article, or even two. The primary aim of 
these two articles is not to provide answers, but to raise questions that may stimulate further 
discussion. Whereas the other article will structure and organize the fragmented debate in le-
gal theory and comparative law on the impact of Europeanization and globalization, this arti-
cle provides a historical and comparative background to the issues involved. Its first part iden-
tifies different perceptions of the relation of private law and the state in Germany and in the 
United States in the 20th century. A second part turns to the earlier history of the relationship 
of the state and private law. There, we examine, on the one hand, for which historical condi-
tions and reasons the state became the ultimate source of authority for private law in Europe. 
On the other hand, we ask why the state nevertheless remained largely irrelevant for doctrinal 
discussions and jurisprudential decisions within private law. At the same time, we identify 
factors that may explain the different developments in the United States and on the European 
continent. On the basis of these comparative and historical observations, we conclude with 
                                                 
1 Michaels/Jansen, Private Law Beyond the State. Europeanization, Globalization, Privatization: American Jour-
nal of Comparative Law 55 (2007) xxx. 
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more general, “theoretical” remarks on some of the problems that may be seen as core aspects 
of the relation of private law and the state. 
 
I. Comparative Perceptions 
 
1. European Perceptions: The State in the Background 
 
During much of the 19th and 20th centuries, European scholars worked on two closely con-
nected assumptions. One was that the validity of all law, including private law, ultimately de-
pends exclusively on the state2. Nearly all private disputes discussed in academic literature 
had been, or could have been, brought before the state’s courts, which applied, as a matter of 
course, a state’s law. For most lawyers, this was neither a problem nor in any sense peculiar: 
Was it not obvious that all law’s validity depended on the state? In fact, when Hans Kelsen 
and Herbert Hart described the positive law’s validity and identity as conceptually depending 
on a basic norm or a rule of recognition3 and thus presupposing a sovereign’s authority4, they 
gave expression to a common understanding. For most lawyers it was a matter of course that 
such a sovereign could only be a national state5 – be it represented by legislative or judicial 
authorities. 
 The second assumption was that insofar as one looked at the substance of rules and 
principles guiding the relations between private individuals (private law)6, it was largely ir-
relevant that the law’s validity depended on the state. Even if the state monopolised the ad-
ministration of the law, private law in this sense was usually not seen as part of public gov-
ernance, but as an expression of corrective justice that was largely autonomous of governmen-
tal decisionmaking. Codifications are normally written not by politicians but by legal experts; 
                                                 
2 See only Eugen Ehrlich, Internationales Privatrecht: Deutsche Rundschau 126 (1906) 419, 425: “Jetzt ist es 
selbstverständlich nur der Staat, der bestimmt, welches Recht in seinen Gemarkungen gelten solle” (see 
Michaels 1245 f.); Reinhard 281: “Recht ist heute von der Staatsgewalt monopolisiert”. 
3 Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre2 (1960) 196 ff.; id., Pure Theory of Law (1967) 193 ff.; Herbert L.A. Hart, 
The Concept of Law2 (1994) 100 ff. Note that both authors relativised the distinction between public and private 
law: Kelsen, Rechtslehre, 284 ff.; id., Theory of Law, 281 f.; Hart, loc. cit., 27 ff.  
4 Hart, Concept of Law (N. 3) 50 ff. 
5 For a non-representative sample of authors from various traditions, see Klaus F. Röhl, Allgemeine Rechtslehre2 
(2001) 184 ff., 186, 282 ff.; Dieter Grimm, Rechtsentstehung, in: id. (ed.), Einführung in das Recht2 (1991) 
40 ff., 41: “Produkt staatlicher Entscheidung”; Johann Braun, Einführung in die Rechtswissenschaft2 (2001) 
216 ff.; (critically,) Josef Esser, Grundsatz und Norm in der richterlichen Fortbildung des Privatrechts4 (1990) 
337: “der rechtstheoretische Solipsismus der etatistischen Haltung entspricht völlig dem 
Ausschließlichkeitsanspruch des politischen Positivismus”; Roberto M. Unger, Knowledge and Politics (1975) 
281-284. For a succinct summary, see Edgar Bodenheimer, Jurisprudence (1940) 52 ff. 
6 Of course, this statement presupposes a separable category of private law, which Kelsen, for example, denied: 
Reine Rechtslehre (N. 3) 109 ff. For a more comprehensive discussion of the concept of private law in German 
and American discourse, see Michaels/Jansen (N. 1) II.A. 
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the great European codifications were much more a restatement meant to technically improve 
the law7 than a fundamental change of substance8. According to a classical view, basic prin-
ciples of private law claim universal validity; and the state has no legitimate governmental in-
terests in matters of private law9. Thus, the sovereign could be regarded as a neutral authority 
to balance conflicting interests of two parties and to find solutions for conflicts that were re-
garded as purely private10. 
 This assumption was maintained even when the principles of corrective justice that 
applied to such conflicts became an object of political controversy. Obviously, in such cases 
modern states “intervened” into private law by means of (democratically legitimated) statutes; 
strict liability and consumer protection are more recent examples of such instances of private 
law becoming politically controversial. However, most private lawyers did not regard such 
debates as more “political” than earlier doctrinal discussions concerning the laesio enormis11 
or culpa levissima12. Even if these conflicts were politically controversial and of significant 
relevance for the economy and society, they all were understood by most lawyers13 as con-
cerning only purely private relations between private actors. Only exceptionally, when, in the 
heyday of the nation state, the economic constitution of society was discussed on a strongly 
                                                 
7 Konrad Zweigert/Hein Kötz, Einführung in die Rechtsvergleichung3 (1996) 78 ff., 84 ff. (for France), 137 ff., 
142 ff.; Paul Koschaker, Europa und das römische Recht4 (1966) 205 (for Germany). On the methodological 
debate see Bernd Mertens, Gesetzgebungskunst im Zeitalter der Kodifikation (2004) 18 ff., 33 ff., 51 ff., further 
references within. 
8 See Zimmermann, Codification; Jansen, European Civil Code, in: Jan M. Smits (ed.), Elgar Encyclopedia of 
Comparative Law (2006) 247 ff. Thus, Bernhard Windscheid had understood the German civil code as a “point 
in the development” of the law (“ein Punkt in der Entwicklung”): Die geschichtliche Schule in der 
Rechtswissenschaft (1878), in: id., Gesammelte Reden und Abhandlungen, ed. by Paul Oertmann (1904) 66, 
75 f.; cf. also Gottlieb Planck, Zur Kritik des Entwurfes eines bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches für das Deutsche Reich: 
Archiv für die civilistische Praxis 75 (1889) 327, 331 ff. 
9 On further tensions between the national-state form of the private law and its non-positive, universal values see 
Christian Joerges, Die Wissenschaft vom Privatrecht und der Nationalstaat, in: Dieter Simon (ed.), Rechtswis-
senschaft in der Bonner Republik (1994) 311 ff., whose focus is, however, on the tensions between the suppos-
edly apolitical, formalistic understanding of private law, which may be attributed to the 18th and 19th century 
German “Privatrechtsgesellschaft” and politically motivated changes during the 20th century. Here, the emphasis 
is more on the shift from a corrective to an instrumental understanding of private law. It is not unlikely, that both 
developments were intellectually closely connected. 
10 See Philipp Heck, Grundriß des Schuldrechts (1929) 1 ff.; Ludwig Enneccerus/Heinrich Lehmann, Recht der 
Schuldverhältnisse. Ein Lehrbuch14 (1954) 5 ff.; Ulrich Huber, Leistungsstörungen, vol. I (1999) 24 ff.; cf. also 
Werner Flume, Allgemeiner Teil des Bürgerlichen Rechts II. Das Rechtsgeschäft3 (1974) 3 ff. 
11 On contractual remedies because of some gross disproportionality in exchange cf. Zimmermann, Obligations 
259 ff., 264 ff., further references within. 
12 Quasi-strict liability for slightest fault, amounting to “negligence without fault”; see Jansen 340 ff., 433 ff., 
further references within. 
13 But see, as exceptions, Victor Mataja, Das Recht des Schadensersatzes vom Standpunkt der Nationalökonomie 
(Leipzig 1888): an economic analysis avant la lettre of extracontractual liability (cf. Izhak Englard, Victor Mataja’s 
Liability for Damages from an Economic Viewpoint: A Centennial to an Ignored Economic Analysis of Tort: Inter-
national Review of Law and Economics 10 [1990] 173 ff.); Karl Renner, Die Rechtsinstitute des Privatrechts und 
ihre soziale Funktion. Ein Beitrag zur Kritik des bürgerlichen Rechts (1929/1965) 58 ff. and passim: a socio-
economic analysis of central institutes of private law, inspired by Marxist ideas. It is no coincidence that both works 
have long been neglected by the dominant legal discourse. 
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ideological basis, did private law become the object of regulatory considerations14. Yet these 
discussions typically concerned only economic law, for only such “modern”, innovative parts 
of private law were understood to especially shape and change the social reality15. 
Accordingly, although influenced by changing or controversial social values, the tradi-
tional core areas of private law, such as the law of obligations, property and inheritance, were 
not regarded as a means of promoting social change or furthering third-party interests and col-
lective goals16. At least in Europe, these latter objectives were widely understood to be the 
domain of public law; only in this domain was the state genuinely active in changing and 
shaping society. Even the regimes of the Third Reich and the German Democratic Republic 
soon gave up their (and their theorists’) far-reaching plans to socialize private law17 and left 
the structure of these core areas of private law largely in their traditional shape18. Private law 
                                                 
14 On the massive interventions into private law during the Republic of Weimar, see Knut W. Nörr, Zwischen 
den Mühlsteinen. Eine Privatrechtsgeschichte der Weimarer Republik (1988) 3 ff. These interventions were 
largely due to wartime economy viz. postwar economy. What is more, genuinely economic, instrumental 
contributions, like Franz Böhm, Wettbewerb und Monopolkampf (1933) 187 ff., 210 ff., 318 ff.; id., Die 
Ordnung der Wirtschaft als geschichtliche Aufgabe und rechtsschöpferische Leistung (1937) 54 ff.; more 
reluctantly id., Privatrechtsgesellschaft und Marktwirtschaft: Ordo. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und 
Gesellschaft 17 (1966) 75 ff., were not published before the Third Reich. For more legal contributions see 
especially Walter Schmidt-Rimpler, Grundfragen einer Erneuerung des Vertragsrechts: Archiv für die 
civilistische Praxis 147 (1941), 130 ff., 149 ff., 157 ff.; Walter Hallstein, Von der Sozialisierung des 
Privatrechts: Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 102 (1942) 530 ff., 546 f.: the individual exercised 
his rights as “Funktionär” or “Organ der Rechtsordnung”; id., Wiederherstellung des Privatrechts: Süddeutsche 
Juristen-Zeitung 1946, 1, 6 f.; Ludwig Raiser, Wirtschaftsverfassung als Rechtsproblem, in: Festschrift Julius 
von Gierke (1950) 181, 196 ff.; Ernst Steindorff, Politik des Gesetzes als Auslegungsmaßstab im 
Wirtschaftsrecht, in: Gotthard Paulus (ed.), Festschrift Karl Larenz zum 70. Geburtstag (1973) 217 ff.; id., 
Wirtschaftsordnung und -steuerung durch Privatrecht?, in: Fritz Baur (ed.), Festschrift Ludwig Raiser (1974) 
621 ff., and Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker, Über das Verhältnis des Rechts der Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen zum 
Privatrecht: Archiv für die civilstische Praxis 168 (1968) 235, 237 ff.; cf. also id., Der Kampf ums Recht in der 
offenen Gesellschaft: Rechtstheorie 20 (1989) 273, 281 ff. A survey of the discussion is given by Joerges, 
Wissenschaft vom Privatrecht (N. 9) 324 ff. 
15 K.W. Nörr, Zwischen den Mühlsteinen (N. 14) 16 ff., 42 ff.; Steindorff, Politik des Gesetzes (N. 14) 232 f. Ac-
cordingly, this debate was largely confined to economic jurists; it had no lasting impact on the general under-
standing of private law method – although the idea of economic law had been devised as a critique of exactly 
this method; see Heinz-Dieter Assmann et al. (eds), Wirtschaftsrecht als Kritik des Privatrechts (1980); see most 
recently Karsten Schmidt, Wirtschaftsrecht: Nagelprobe des Zivilrechts – Das Kartellrecht als Beispiel: Archiv 
für die civilistische Praxis 206 (2006) 169 ff. 
16 K.W. Nörr, Zwischen den Mühlsteinen (N. 14) 48 ff., 72 ff., 100 ff. Later, cf. especially Ludwig Raiser, Der 
Gleichheitsgrundsatz im Privatrecht: Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handelsrecht 111 (1948) 75, 78 ff. Although 
proceeding from the assumption that the principle of equality could have the function of achieving a certain state 
of society (77) and despite arguing on the basis of arguments of Böhm, Eucken and Hallstein (93 ff.; cf. N. 14), 
Raiser apparently understood these core areas of private law primarily as mirroring social life (77); accordingly, 
he mostly argued as if private law concerned only the relations between two (or more) individuals (cf. esp. 88, 
but see 95 f.). Some opposing views can be found in the Alternativkommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch 
(1979 ff.); see also, e.g., Christian Joerges, Bereicherungsrecht als Wirtschaftsrecht. Eine Untersuchung zur 
Entwicklung von Leistungs- und Eingriffskondiktion (1977). 
17 Inga Markovits, Sozialistisches und bürgerliches Zivilrechtsdenken in der DDR (1969) 105 ff.; id., Civil Law 
in East Germany – Its Development and Relation to Soviet Law and Ideology: Yale L.J. 78 (1968) 1, 35ff.; see 
also Hans-Peter Haferkamp, Das Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch während des Nationalsozialismus und in der DDR - 
mögliche Aspekte und Grenzen eines Vergleichs (2005). 
18 This conflict between program and action has confused some scholars; see, e.g., Uwe Wesel, Geschichte des 
Rechts (1997) 474 (“im Zivilrecht änderte sich einiges”), 475 (“Es änderte sich nicht viel”).  
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changed its substance to a considerable (though as to its extent, disputed) degree, but these 
changes were brought about largely as an interpretative reaction to assumed changed circum-
stances in society, not through intervention by and on account of the state19. The plans for a 
“Volksgesetzbuch” failed20, and when East Germany finally adopted a new private-law codi-
fication in 1975, it looked very much like a modernized version of the old Civil Code21. Ac-
cordingly, when the law of obligations in West Germany became more “social” in the course 
of the 20th century, the prevailing explanation was that the law had (more or less directly) re-
sponded to social and cultural change; apparently the state as such had no particular role to 
play in such processes22. 
 Today, both of these assumptions have lost their self-evident character. As a matter of 
fact, they offer an incomplete picture of the law in 19th and 20th century Europe. Private-law 
rules could never be reduced to a fair balancing of the interests of individual parties in a legal 
conflict: The ability to acquire bona fide the property of a third person or the question of how 
to design the legal form of business enterprises has always been guided by the public interest 
in a flourishing market23; and the natural-law codifications were driven to a significant degree 
by an impulse to further the common good24. Furthermore, private arbitration25 and transna-
tional customs of trade developing independently, without a legal basis in a specific state’s 
law26, had existed long before the 19th century. But in the 20th century, scholars nonetheless 
by and large did not accept transnational law as autonomous vis-à-vis national legal sys-
                                                 
19 Prima facie, this thesis appears to differ from Bernd Rüthers, Die unbegrenzte Auslegung. Zum Wandel der 
Privatrechtsordnung im Nationalsozialismus6 (2005) 114 ff. et passim, who emphasizes political influence on le-
gal methods in the Third Reich as opposed to economic and social influences in the Weimar Republic. However, 
the distinction is less sharp once we accept that, in a totalitarian state, what Rüthers calls “political” encompasses 
economy and “the social”.  
20 Gerd Brüggemeier, Oberstes Gesetz ist das Wohl des deutschen Volkes. Das Projekt des 
„Volksgesetzbuches“: Juristenzeitung 1990, 24 ff. 
21 For closer analysis, see Jörg Eckert/Hans Hattenhauer (eds), Das Zivilgesetzbuch der DDR vom 19. Juni 1975 
(1995). 
22 See Franz Wieacker, Das Sozialmodell der klassischen Privatrechtsgesetzbücher und die Entwicklung der 
modernen Gesellschaft (1953) 18 ff.; Claus-Wilhelm Canaris, Wandlungen des Schuldvertragsrechts – 
Tendenzen zu seiner Materialisierung: Archiv für die civilistische Praxis 200 (2000) 273 ff.: Both authors attrib-
ute changes within the traditional core areas of private law primarily to judges expressing changing social values, 
not to interventions of the state. 
23 Cf. David Mevius, Commentarii in Jus Lubecense Libri Quinque4 (Frankfurt and Leipzig 1700) pars III, tit. II, 
art. II, n. 5, arguing that the institute of bona-fide acquisition had been introduced by statutory law – against the 
principles of the ius commune – for public commercial interests: “Prospectum enim hâc in re est commerciorum 
utilitati & securitati, cui Lubecensis Jurisprudentia contra merum jus laxè opitulatur, quia nempe ad summum 
Reipublicae, cui Leges conduntur, pertineat”. 
24 See infra at NN. 198 f. 
25 Knut W. Nörr/Kerstin Schlecht, Zur Entwicklung der Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit in Deutschland: Gesetze und 
Entwürfe des 19. Jahrhunderts, in: Vito Piergiovanni (ed.), From lex mercatoria to Commercial Law, Compara-
tive Studies in Anglo-American and Continental Legal History (2005) 165, 166 ff.; Julian D.M. Lew, Achieving 
the Dream: Autonomous Arbitration: Arbitration International 22 (2006) 179, 183 f. 
26 Cf. Hans Großmann-Doerth, Der Jurist und das autonome Recht des Welthandels: Juristische 
Wochenschrift 1929, 3447 ff. 
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tems27. Moreover, and more importantly, most scholars writing on private law considered 
such developments to be peripheral to what was understood to be private law. 
 
2. American Perceptions: Instrumentalism without a State 
 
Interestingly, the American legal system has experienced a remarkably different development. 
On the one hand, even in the times of legal formalism, the distinction between public and pri-
vate law was of less normative significance than on the European continent28. Today only 
proponents of corrective-justice approaches to private law, such as Fried or Coleman29, ex-
plicitly argue for a sharp distinction of private and public law and explain private law as inde-
pendent of public concerns. On the other hand, American judges had developed the law on the 
basis of instrumental considerations as early as the beginning of the 19th century30; and in the 
20th century, as result of the legal realists’ critique of the private/public distinction as artifi-
cial31, it has been common for them to develop private law on the basis of public policy. It is 
a matter of course for judges to understand private law as a means of achieving social ends. 
Although there is wide disagreement over what these ends should be, there is fairly little 
doubt that private law must be understood and evaluated in light of these ends. Indeed, even a 
decision like Lochner v. U.S.32, now universally decried as an outburst of both judicial for-
malism and a false preference for an autonomous private sphere over valid public concern, is 
really based on the weighing of public concerns – on the one hand “the interest of the state 
that its population should be strong and robust”33, on the other “the ability of the laborer to 
support himself and his family”34. Justice Holmes made clear that the decision concerned con-
flicting instrumental theories when he wrote, in dissent, that “a Constitution is not intended to 
embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the 
                                                 
27 Cf. Francis A. Mann, Lex Facit Arbitrum, in: Pieter Sanders (ed.), International Arbitration. Liber Amicorum 
for Martin Domke (1967) 157, 159: “In the legal sense no international commercial arbitration exists. … every 
arbitration is a national arbitration, that is to say, subject to a specific system of national law”; today similarly 
Christian von Bar/Peter Mankowski, Internationales Privatrecht2 (2003) § 2-75 ff. 
28 John H. Merryman, The Public Law-Private Law Distinction in European and American Law: Journal of Pub-
lic Law 17 (1963) 3 ff.; see also Michaels/Jansen (N. 1) II.A. 
29 Cf. Charles Fried, Contract as Promise (1981); Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability: Journal of Le-
gal Studies 2 (1973) 151 ff.; Ernest J. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (1995); Arthur Ripstein, Equality, Responsi-
bility, and the Law (1999); Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of Principle (2001) 3 ff. 
30 Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1780-1860 (1977) 1 ff., 17 ff. 
31 Cf. Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1870-1960 (1992) 206; id., The History of the 
Public/Private Distinction: University of Pennsylvania L.R. 130 (1982) 1423 ff. 
32 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
33 Loc. cit. at 60. 
34 Loc. cit. at 56. 
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citizen to the state or of laissez faire”35.
 However, whereas progressive legal realists and theoreticians of the New Deal con-
nected these social ends explicitly with the state36, today these policies are apparently not de-
rived from or connected with the political domination of the state. Instead, legal academia 
and, to a lesser degree, the courts have bound themselves interdisciplinarily to other social 
sciences, especially to economics, including public-choice- or game-theory37. Besides follow-
ing precedent, judges are expected to implement moral norms based in and policies favoured 
by society, and even when they make decisions based on official policies, they do so not be-
cause these policies are official but because they have the sufficient social support38. Indeed, 
it seems plausible that the common law in the United States, other than in continental Europe, 
is thought of as based in society rather than in the state. Paradoxically, it appears that whereas 
European private law is based on the state but not subordinated to the state’s instrumental 
ends, private law in the United States is subordinated to such ends, but these ends (and the 
law’s validity) are not found in the state.  
 
3. Misperceptions? Transnational Private Law and State Instrumentalism 
 
Recently, this paradoxical difference has changed fundamentally: On the one hand, the state is 
apparently retreating from the legal system39. Thus, private lawmaking has become increas-
ingly common, both within the national legal systems and on a transnational level, and in ar-
eas as diverse as labour law, accounting standards, good governance, and sport40. With the 
rise of party autonomy in choice of law it has become usual business for parties to choose the 
law they wish applied to their cases; thus the applicability of a nation’s law is subordinated to 
a private choice. In a parallel development, national courts are regarded more and more as just 
one option besides international arbitration, which since 1950 has gained an increasing degree 
                                                 
35 Loc. cit. at 75. See also Lawrence Friedman, American Law in the 20th Century (2002) 18: “In a sense, 
Holmes and [the majority] saw eye to eye”. 
36 Cf. Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State: Political Science Quar-
terly 38 (1923) 470 ff.; Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty: Cornell Law Quarterly 13 (1927) 8 ff.; id., 
The Basis of Contract: Harvard L.R. 46 (1933) 553, 585 ff. 
37 Cf. Brian H. Bix, Law as an Autonomous Discipline, in: Peter Cane/Mark Tushnet (eds), The Oxford Hand-
book of Legal Studies (2003) 975, 978 ff. 
38 Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Nature of the Common Law (1988) 28. 
39 Philippe Nonet/Philip Selznick, Law and Society in Transition2 (2001) 102 f. 
40 For a recent overview Johannes Köndgen, Privatisierung des Rechts: Archiv für die civilistische Praxis 206 
(2006) 477, 479 ff.; cf. Jens Adolphsen, Eine lex sportiva für den internationalen Sport?, in: Carl-Heinz Witt et 
al. (eds), Die Privatisierung des Privatrechts (Jahrbuch Junger Privatrechtswissenschaftler 2002) 281 ff.; id., 
Grenzen der internationalen Harmonisierung durch Übernahme internationaler privater Standards: RabelsZ 68 
(2004) 154 ff. 
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of autonomy from national legal systems41. Lawyers have started to act and think transnation-
ally42. Thus, the intense debate about a modern “lex mercatoria”43 may be understood as an 
expression of the feeling of many of the participants that an international body of law or le-
gally binding custom is emerging, in addition to and independent of the legal systems of na-
tional states44. 
 In a parallel development, legal scholars have begun discussing doctrinal problems 
and systematic questions of private law as being independent of national legal systems45: 
“Principles” of European and transnational law have emerged46; they may be seen as an ex-
pression of the feeling that the foundations of private law can – or even should – be under-
stood as independent of a nation’s laws47. Even judges are increasingly prepared to transgress 
the national borders of their legal systems and accept foreign judgements or international 
sources as authoritative. Much debate focuses on human-rights adjudication in which this is 
now commonplace48; in this context, a relevant factor may be the feeling among judges, or 
                                                 
41 Lew, Achieving the Dream (N. 25) 184 ff., 189 ff., 195 ff. 
42 Cf. H. Patrick Glenn, A Transnational Concept of Law, in: Handbook of Legal Studies (N. 37) 839, 844 ff.; 
Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Law, in: Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (N. 8) 738 ff. 
43 Cf. Ursula Stein, Lex Mercatoria. Realität und Theorie (1995); for an analysis of the validity of such a body of 
transnational rules and customs Michaels 1218 ff.; id., Privatautonomie und Privatrechtskodifikation. Zu An-
wendbarkeit und Geltung allgemeiner Vertragsrechtsprinzipien: RabelsZ 62 (1998) 580, 601 ff., 614 ff. Defen-
dants of the idea of a lex mercatoria include Clive M. Schmitthoff, Commercial Law in a Changing Economic 
Climate2 (1981) 18 ff.; Jan H. Dalhuisen, Dalhuisen on International Commercial, Financial and Trade Law 
(2000) 63 ff., 98 ff.; Hans-Joachim Mertens, Nichtlegislatorische Rechtsvereinheitlichung durch transnationales 
Wirtschaftsrecht und Rechtsbegriff: RabelsZ 56 (1992) 219, 226 ff.; id., Lex Mercatoria: A Self-applying Sys-
tem Beyond National Law?, in: Gunther Teubner (ed.), Global Law Without a State (1997) 32 ff.; Köndgen, Pri-
vatisierung (N. 40) 501 f.; cf. also Klaus Peter Berger, Understanding International Commercial Arbitration, in: 
id. (ed.), The Practice of Transnational Law (2000) 5 ff.; The Empirical and Theoretical Underpinnings of Law 
Merchant: Chicago Journal of International Law 5 (2004) 1 ff. (Symposium Issue); Roy Goode, Commercial 
Law in the Next Millenium (1998) 88 ff., tries to avoid the question; more critically, Filip De Ly, International 
Business Law and Lex Mercatoria (1992) 207 ff. 
44 Cf. Gunther Teubner, Globale Bukowina. Zur Emergenz eines transnationalen Rechtspluralismus: 
Rechtshistorisches Journal 1996, 255, 264 ff. 
45 Cf. Ernst Rabel, Das Recht des Warenkaufs, vol. I, (1936); Ernst von Caemmerer, Bereicherung und unerlaubte 
Handlung, in: Hans Dölle (ed.), Festschrift Ernst Rabel, vol. I (1954) 333 ff.; Zimmermann, Obligations (1st ed. 
1989); Hein Kötz, Europäisches Vertragsrecht, vol. I (1996). In France, similar ideas were expressed already at 
the beginning of the 20th century: Christophe Jamin, Saleilles’ and Lambert’s Old Dream Revisited: American 
Journal of Comparative Law 50 (2002) 701, 705 ff. 
46 Ole Lando/Hugh Beale, Principles of European Contract Law, Part I/II (2000); Ole Lando/Eric Clive/André 
Prüm/Reinhard Zimmermann, Principles of European Contract Law, Part III (2003); UNIDROIT (ed.), Principles 
of International Commercial Contracts, 2004 (first 1994); see also Michael J. Bonell, An International Restate-
ment of Contract Law3 (2005); European Group on Tort Law, Principles of European Tort Law. Text and Com-
mentary (2005); Study Group on a European Civil Code/Christian von Bar, Principles of European Law. Be-
nevolent Intervention in Another’s Affairs (PEL Ben. Int.) (2006). 
47 Reinhard Zimmermann, Roman Law, Contemporary Law, European Law (2001) 107 ff.; id., Ius Commune 
and the Principles of European Contract Law. Contemporary Renewal of an Old Idea, in: Hec-
tor MacQueen/Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), European Contract Law. Scots and South African Perspectives 
(2006) 1 ff.; id., Comparative Law and the Europeanization of Private Law, in: Mathias Reimann/Reinhard 
Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law, 539, 563 ff. 
48 Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (2004) 65 ff.; Christopher McCrudden, A Common Law of Hu-
man Rights?: Transnational Judicial Conversations on Constitutional Rights: Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 20 
(2000) 499 ff., 506 ff., with an illuminating discussion of a range of conceptual, normative and theoretical prob-
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within their audiences, that human rights protect citizens against the state and should therefore 
be understood as an autonomous body of non-state law that is developed and justified in 
transnational discourse49. If similar developments can now increasingly be seen in private 
law50, this suggests a possible, though implicit, similar assumption that private law emerges 
from transnational discourse51. 
 On the other hand, state instrumentalism seems to be on the rise. In the United States, 
the rise of regulatory statutes is deplored as an intrusion of the state into the common law52. 
At the same time, the European Union (in this respect acting like a state) is more and more 
adopting an “American”, instrumental approach to private law53: it increasingly uses private-
law regulation for pursuing public goals. In consequence, the state becomes an “invisible 
party” to legal proceedings between private individuals54. Consumer law is a telling example: 
From a traditional perspective, as represented by Europe’s different national legal systems, 
consumer law aims to protect “weak” consumers against dominant or even unfair business en-
terprises55; such law is based on a corrective-justice approach to private law. Modern Euro-
pean directives on consumer law, by contrast, are drafted to create and protect a common 
European market. They aim to further competition and trade and for this reason create con-
venient conditions for everybody to participate in this market56. Thus, they do not aim exclu-
                                                                                                                                                        
lems of this development: loc. cit., 510 ff.; Ruth Bader Ginsburg, “A Decent Respect to the Opinions of [Hu-
man]kind”: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication: Cambridge L.J. 64 (2005) 
575 ff. = Florida International University L.R. 1 (2006) 27 ff.; cf. also Angelika Nußberger, Wer zitiert wen? – 
Zur Funktion von Zitaten bei der Herausbildung gemeineuropäischen Verfassungsrechts: Juristenzeitung 
2006 763, 765 ff. 
49 McCrudden, A Common Law of Human Rights? (N. 48) 527 ff.; Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the Mod-
ern Ius Gentium: Harvard L.R. 119 (2005) 129 ff.; cf. also Reinhard 25 f. 
50 Examples are Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Services, (2000) 1 A.C. 32 ff. (H.L.); for Germany, 
Bundesgerichtshof, January 12, 2005, reference number: XII ZR 227/03 (BGHZ 162, 1, 7 f.); Walter Odersky, 
Harmonisierende Auslegung und europäische Rechtskultur: Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht 1994, 1 ff.; 
Hein Kötz, Der Bundesgerichtshof und die Rechtsvergleichung, in: Claus-Wilhelm Canaris et al. (eds), 50 Jahre 
Bundesgerichtshof, Festgabe aus der Wissenschaft, vol. II (2000) 825 ff. Cf. also, for Europe, Ilka Klöckner, 
Grenzüberschreitende Bindung an zivilgerichtliche Präjudizien. Möglichkeiten und Grenzen im Europäischen 
Rechtsraum und bei staatsvertraglich angelegter Rechtsvereinheitlichung (2006). 
51 Cf., within the European context, Reinhard Zimmermann, Savigny’s Legacy: Legal History, Comparative 
Law, and the Emergence of a European Science: Law Quarterly Review 112 (1996) 576 ff.; for a global (Euro-
pean-American) model, see James Gordley, Comparative Legal Research: Its Function in the Development of 
Harmonized Law: American Journal of Comparative Law 43 (1995) 555 ff. 
52 Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes (1982) 1 ff.  
53 On this approach cf. William W. Fisher III et al. (eds), American Legal Realism (1993) 167 ff., further refer-
ences within. 
54 The picture is taken from Berman 37. It may be an overstatement if Berman interprets such developments as 
totally new: Society was already an “invisible party”, when the bona-fide-acquisition of property was invented 
(supra at N. 23), or when the Roman aediles ordered the seller of slaves to inform buyers about all latent defects 
(infra at NN. 86 f.). Thus, contrary to what Berman suggests, it is not sure that such developments will necessar-
ily have a devastating effect on Western legal systems. On the theme of law’s demise, see also Steven Smith, The 
(always) Imminent Death of the Law: San Diego L.R. 43 (2006) xxx. 
55 Cf. Reinhard Zimmermann, The New German Law of Obligations (2005) 160 ff. 
56 Bettina Heiderhoff, Vertrauen versus Vertragsfreiheit im europäischen Verbrauchervertragsrecht: Zeitschrift 
für Europäisches Privatrecht 2003, 769 ff.; ead., Gemeinschaftsprivatrecht (2005) 79 ff.; Caroline Meller-
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sively at balancing the interests of consumers and business enterprises. Instead, they utilize 
individual consumer rights as instruments to advance a public or collective interest of welfare 
maximization; they can be understood only from such an instrumentalist point of view. 
 
4. State, Domination, and Instrumentalism 
 
Prima vista, both developments run counter to each other, and they invite rethinking the role 
of the state in private law and in private-law thinking: To which degree are fundamental con-
cepts of private law shaped by, dependent on, and focussed on the state? Would it be possible, 
or perhaps even desirable to detach private-law thinking from the state? From where could le-
gal rules and arguments derive their legitimacy, if not from the state’s authority? These ques-
tions require clarifying the relation between state and private law. 
 The state as it is understood today is a modern concept. It is an abstract legal entity or, 
more specifically, a juristic person dominating a people on a specific geographic part of the 
world57. In this sense, it describes neither the Roman Republic nor ancient and medieval em-
pires nor even the early monarchies in Sicily, England, France, or Spain. In fact, the concept 
was coined only after the religious conflicts of the 16th and 17th centuries, when the traditional 
monarchies were transformed into European nation states58. It was not until then that the state 
was seen as an abstract entity independent of the monarch’s person, that it developed an ex-
tensive, complex administration monopolising the exercise of power, and that it gained im-
mediate control of its citizens59. However, the modern state has not been the exclusive prov-
ince of attempts to publicly control and administer private law. When reconstructing the mod-
ern relation between private law and the state, therefore, it may be more helpful to proceed 
from the Weberian concept of legitimate domination (legitime Herrschaft)60. This is not to 
say, of course, that the concept of the state is useless; to the contrary. “Domination” does not 
fully describe the place of the state in modern private law. Thus, it does not account for the 
fact that the modern state’s power and control are abstract rather than personal and that its 
                                                                                                                                                        
Hannich, Verbraucherschutz im Schuldvertragsrecht (2005) 59 ff., 67 ff., both with further references. 
57 Cf. Georg Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre3 (1914) 174 ff., 180 ff.; van Crefeld 1; cf. also Reinhard 15 ff. In 
substance, this conception of the state goes back to Hobbes; today it is widely acknowledged.  
58 Cf. Alan Harding, Medieval Law and the Foundations of the State (2002) 295 ff., 307 ff.; van Crefeld esp. 
124 ff.; Christoph Möllers, Staat als Argument (2000) 215 ff., further references within. 
59 Before, central domination had always been mediated by independent intermediary powers; see Reinhard 
196 ff., 212 ff. 
60 Max Weber, Die drei Typen der legitimen Herrschaft, in: Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre7 
(1988) 475 ff.; cf. also id., Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft5 (1972) 28 f., 122 ff.; for the English terminology id., 
Economy and Society, vol. I, ed. by Guenther Roth/Claus Wittich (1968) 53 f., 212 ff.: “domination” is different 
from “power”, as it is defined “as the probability that … commands … will be obeyed by a given group of per-
sons”; it is normally based on “the belief in legitimacy”. 
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psychological role may go beyond “domination” in various ways. “Domination” nonetheless 
yields specific insights for a historical perspective, since it not only identifies core aspects of 
the modern relation between private law and the state, but it applies as well to other forms of 
government, like chiefdoms, ancient city-states, or empires.  
 Yet the idea of “external” domination over private law is not simple and evident, but 
complex and difficult to grasp: It presupposes a pre-existing field of private law onto which 
the external actor is thrust, be it the official of the government of an ancient city, a sovereign 
monarch, or the state. Thus it is assumed that private law can be thought of “prior to”, and in-
dependent, of such public authority. Private law in this sense is no more than the system of 
rules guiding the relations between private individuals61. Now, domination can express itself 
in two forms that are, at least conceptually, rather different. First, the external authority can be 
seen as a disinterested and thus neutral sovereign or judge. In this case, private law continues 
to be thought of as independent of any external – public or private – interest. Domination in 
this sense expresses itself only in the monopolisation of the creation and administration of 
private law; it is based on the external authority’s control over decisions within the field of 
private law. In the second form of domination, the external authority can actively pursue some 
external – individual or collective, private or public – interest by means of private law. Nor-
matively, it thus becomes a third party to private transactions. An example is European con-
sumer-law directives drafted to further the common market62. 
 Although both aspects of public domination over private law may come together, from 
an analytical and – as will be shown – from a historical perspective, they are independent of 
each other. On the one hand, full sovereignty may not be necessary for private law to be used 
as a means for pursuing collective goals, and, on the other hand, a sovereign who has fully 
monopolised private law may remain in a neutral, disinterested position. Thus, public domina-
tion over private law should not be equated conceptually with an instrumental, regulatory ap-
proach to the law. Instrumentalism and monopolisation of the law are independent aspects of 
public domination and shall be treated as such in the analysis that follows. Thus, private law 
may either be independent of any public domination, or it may be determined by some exter-
nal dominator. Such domination may express itself either in the monopolisation of law crea-
tion and administration (to varying degrees), or in a political instrumentalisation of private 
law, as contrasted with a non-instrumental, corrective-justice approach. 
 
                                                 
61 On the concept of private law see supra N. 6. 
62 Supra at NN. 54 ff. 
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II. Historical Observations 
 
1. Lawyers, Magistrates, and Emperors 
 
Historical stories of private law typically start with Roman law63, and, indeed, Roman law is 
probably the most important origin of the tradition of Western private-law thinking64. By con-
trast, the origins of the modern state’s administrating and controlling private law might more 
adequately be traced to a much later stage, when the Catholic Church established itself as a 
legally structured, hierarchically organised society and thus developed the modern ideas of 
sovereignty and independent lawmaking65. The development of Roman law is particularly in-
teresting precisely because of this temporal disjuncture: It provides a history of increasing 
public domination over private law in the absence of a state in the modern sense. What is 
more, although the ultimate outcome of this development, Justinian’s corpus iuris civilis  was 
established under imperial domination, it later became the point of reference for the ius com-
mune—a tradition of legal learning, which conceived of private law as largely independent of 
such domination or political authority. 
 Roman lawyers were normally reluctant to discuss abstract questions, like “sources” of 
the law or even the relation between private law and public domination or government. They 
were more interested in the discussion of concrete cases; theory was outside the scope of their 
business66. Yet they had to know where to find the law, and here Gaius told Roman students 
in the second century AD that it was preferable to speak of the laws of the Roman people in 
the plural (iura populi Romani). These laws consisted not only of the statutes (leges), the 
plebiscites, the Senate’s opinions (senatus consulta), the Emperor’s decisions (constitutiones 
principium), and the edicts of the magistrates, but also of the opinions of legal scholars (re-
sponsa prudentium)67. Thus, different elements or “layers” of the law that had developed at 
different times were meant to complement or even correct each other68; accordingly, they 
were conceived of as normatively independent of each other69. Hence, the law’s validity was 
neither related to a “state” as such nor – at least until Justinian put the law into a new, com-
                                                 
63 This is true even in the common law (at least in England); cf. David Ibbetson, A Historical Introduction to the 
Law of Obligations (1999) 6 ff.; Stroud F.C. Milsom, A Natural History of the Common Law (2003) 1 ff., 20 ff. 
64 On finding and inventing “origins” in historical research see Jansen, “Tief ist der Brunnen der 
Vergangenheit”. Funktion, Methode und Ausgangspunkt historischer Fragestellungen in der 
Privatrechtsdogmatik: Zeitschrift für neuere Rechtsgeschichte 27 (2005) 202 ff. 
65 Cf. Berman 4 f., 85 ff., 113 ff.; cf. also Reinhard 28, 186 f., 259 ff. 
66 Cf. John P. Dawson, The Oracles of the Law (1968) 113 ff.; Schulz 70 ff., 146 ff. 
67 Gaius, Institutiones, I,2; see Barry Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman Law (1969) 14 ff. 
68 Cf. Papinian, D. 1,1,7,1. 
69 Wieacker, Röm. Rechtsgeschichte 198 ff. 
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prehensive corpus iuris70 – to the general will of a “sovereign”. It was the product of different 
and independent actors. 
 Such a plural system of legal sources may prima vista be explained by the fact that the 
Roman jurists never really developed a modern concept of the state; conceptually the Roman 
“state” was still identical with the Roman people (Populus Romanus)71. True, towards the end 
of the Republic the Romans had come rather close to adopting the idea of a separated state72. 
It was possible to speak of the res publicae Populi Romani, and the Populus Romanus could 
as such acquire rights and duties; in fact, the magistrates acted for the Populus Romanus73, 
much as the prosecutor in today’s United States represents “the people”. Yet, in later times, 
domination was attributed personally to the emperor, not to an abstract government of the 
Populus Romanus74. Furthermore, even at the end of the Roman republic, Roman lawyers 
proceeded from a plural conception of their legal sources, which adequately presented the law 
as the product of different groups or actors within the legal system: Of course, the jurists be-
lieved that the XII Tables, the first Roman law and core of the ius civile, was a basic, integra-
tive legal text for the Roman people as a whole75. But the senate’s opinions represented pri-
marily the Roman nobilitas or the political establishment; conversely, the plebiscites had been 
furnished with legal force in order to grant the plebs a balancing means of expressing its will 
in legally binding form. Even more importantly, the law had long been administered and de-
veloped outside the government: Priests, not legislators, advised parties about the dates on 
which to take legal actions or about the correct, effective formulation of legal proceedings, 
last wills, or contracts76. Later, this tradition had been continued by private iuris consulti, 
learned jurists, who devoted their lives to the law. Within a few centuries they developed a 
specific legal language and transformed the still archaic law of the XII Tables into a highly 
                                                 
70 Cf. D. Const. Tanta, 19: The texts of the corpus iuris, issued by the emperor Justinian, were meant to replace 
all former law. Even Justinian, however, tried to legitimate his commands with the Roman tradition of legal 
learning; cf. Inst. Const. Imperatoriam, 3 ff.; D. Const. Tanta, 13, 19, 21, 23 f.; see Schulz 359 f.  
71 See Max Kaser, Das Römische Privatrecht, vol. I2 (1971) 304 f. 
72 Cf. also van Crefeld 53 f.; see also Walter Eder, Der Bürger und sein Staat – der Staat und seine Büger, in: id. 
(ed.), Staat und Staatlichkeit in der frühen römischen Republik (1988) 12 ff., and the other contributions to this 
volume. 
73 Wolfgang Kunkel/Roland Wittmann, Staatsordnung und Staatspraxis der Römischen Republik. Zweiter 
Abschnitt. Die Magistratur (1995) 11 and passim. 
74 Max Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht, vol. II2 (1975) 151 f. Now, the government acted as the fiscus Caesaris, 
which originally had been the emperor’s personal assets, distinct from the res Populi Romani: id., Privatrecht I 
(N. 71) 305 f. 
75 “(F)ons omnis publici privatique … iuris”: Livius, Ab urbe condita, 3,34,6. Cf. also loc. cit., 3,31-57; 
Jochen Bleicken, Lex Publica. Gesetz und Recht in der Römischen Republik (1975) 92 f.; Fögen 63 ff.; 
Wieacker, Röm. Rechtsgeschichte 287 ff. 
76 Wieacker, Röm. Rechtsgeschichte 310 ff., 551 ff.; see also Alfons Bürge, Römisches Privatrecht (1999) 87 ff.; 
Fögen 127 ff. 
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complex body of legal learning77 based on methods of Hellenistic scholarship and remem-
bered in voluminous textbooks. As result, at the end of the Republic this “privately produced” 
lawyers’ law was largely independent of governmental domination and thus autonomous of 
the political system78. 
 Nevertheless, the government had maintained means of controlling – loosely – the 
law’s administration and influencing the law’s substantial development. Thus, the senate con-
tinued to issue senatus consulta, authoritative senatorial opinions that, though technically not 
legislative acts, immediately became part of the legal system. A well-known example is the 
senatus consultum Vellaeanum that for purposes of public policy prevented women from in-
terceding79. Even more important was the magistrates’ control of the legal administration. 
According to the rules of the formulary process80, the praetor or the aediles, high magistrates 
in charge of the legal administration, were authorized to decide whether an action or excep-
tion was granted in a concrete case. Thus, they assumed a decisive role in the development of 
the law’s substance by adopting new actions into their edicts, annually announcing the actions 
and defences they were prepared to acknowledge. 
These magistrates were high officials of the government, and they were clearly acting 
as such. Even if most of them were probably unable individually to formulate the highly tech-
nical texts of their edicts and in this respect had to rely on professional advice of private iuris 
consulti81, it would be wrong to infer that they were mere representatives or a “bridgehead” of 
the legal community within the political sphere82. Adopting a new formula and granting an 
action remained governmental decisions, and many of these formulas expressed interventions 
into the legal system based on public policy. Thus, the (modern) “aedilitian remedies” for de-
fects of sold goods have grown out of an equally specific and pragmatic edict of the aediles, 
which ordered the notoriously ill-reputed slave-traders to inform potential purchasers of any 
illness or defect of the slave83. Every slave to be sold on the market had to wear a board on 
                                                 
77 On the role of the learned jurists, see Ernest Metzger, Roman Judges, Case Law, and Principles of Procedure: 
Law and History Review 22 (2004) 243, 251 ff. In fact, the iuris consulti may be seen as the main source of the 
classical Roman law. 
78 Fögen 174 ff., 199 ff., 207 ff. 
79 D. 16,1; C. 4,29; Nov. 134,8; cf. Zimmermann, Obligations 145 ff.; Wolfgang Ernst, Interzession. Vom Verbot 
der Fraueninterzession über die Sittenwidrigkeit von Angehörigenbürgschaften zum Schutz des Verbrauchers als 
Interzedenten, in: Reinhard Zimmermann et al. (eds), Rechtsgeschichte und Privatrechtsdogmatik, 1999, 395, 
397 ff. 
80 On this Wieacker, Römische Rechtsgeschichte, 447 ff. with further references. 
81 Wieacker, Röm. Rechtsgeschichte 452 f.; Schulz 63; in detail, Fögen 190 ff.; Oliver M. Brupacher, Wider das 
Richterkönigtum / A King of Judges?: Ancilla Iuris 2006, 107 ff. 
82 Fögen 196 ff.: “homunculus”. The matter is debated among Romanists. Although there is much truth in 
Fögen’s critique of the traditional view, which saw the praetor primarily as a political “minister of justice”, the 
political function of the praetor within the legal system should not be neglected. 
83 Ulpian, D. 21,1,1 pr.; see Zimmermann, Obligations 311 ff., further references within. 
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which his defects were listed, and the seller was made liable if he violated this duty. The par-
allels to the European Union’s information requirements and individual rights of revocation84 
should be apparent: Political participants in the legal system use private-law instruments in 
order to create a functioning market for the general public. Similarly, the habitator of a house, 
a man who rented the whole block, letting different flats or rooms to other tenants, was made 
strictly liable for damage caused by things thrown out of the building85. The prime purpose of 
this praetorian actio de deiectis vel effusis was a public policy one – not fair compensation but 
to fight the notoriously dangerous practice of throwing waste out of the windows of upper 
floor flats86. The habitator was made liable independently of any personal fault87 because he 
was the only person who could possibly proceed against the bad habits of his tenants. And 
when a freeman had been killed, the action was treated as an actio popularis, which meant 
that everybody was entitled to claim the penalty for himself88. 
 Yet despite such political intervention into the legal system, and despite the formal 
governmental control of the law’s administration, Roman law has become famous for the high 
degree of autonomy from political government it had gained by the end of the Republic. In 
fact, the praetors were never able to fully control the law’s development; to a large degree, 
they simply acknowledged earlier developments within the privately developing legal system, 
as expressed in the collective expertise of the iuris consulti89. This autonomy of the law re-
sulted from its scholarly, self-referential development in the hands of iuris consulti, who were 
both economically independent and not part of the political classes90. 
Such autonomy was not acceptable for the emperors, who accordingly tried to take 
control of the legal system. Thus, from early on, the emperors had allowed extraordinary ap-
peals against decisions in the formulary process, and a new, “extraordinary” procedure admin-
istered by public servants (cognitio extra ordinem) came to replace the traditional formulary 
process. Around 130 A.D., the emperor Hadrian entrusted the young lawyer Julian with the 
formulation of an edictum perpetuum, a final version of the edict. Thus, the magistrates were 
                                                 
84 See supra at NN. 18 ff. 
85 Ulpian, D. 9,3; see Reinhard Zimmermann, Effusum vel deiectum, in: Dieter Medicus (ed.), Festschrift Hermann 
Lange (1992) 301 ff. 
86 Ulpian, D. 9,3,1,1: “There is no one who will deny that the above edict … is most useful; for it is in the public 
interest that everyone should move about and gather together without fear or danger” (trans. by Alan Watson, 
The Digest of Justinian, vol. I [1998]); see Zimmermann, Effusum (N. 85) 301 ff. 
87 Ulpian, D. 9,3,1,4. 
88 Ulpian, D. 9,3,5,5; see also Julianus B.M. van Hoeck, D. 9, 3, 5, 4: Übersetzungsfragen im Bereich der actio de 
deiectis vel effusis als Popularklage: Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte/Romanistische Abteilung 
117 (2000) 454, 463 ff. 
89 Supra N. 82. 
90 Wolfgang Kunkel, Herkunft und soziale Stellung der römischen Juristen2 (1967) 41 ff., 50 ff., 58 ff.; Schulz 
48 ff., 119 ff.  
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no longer allowed, as before, to announce new forms of actions or legal exceptions on an an-
nually new edict. Their constructive contribution to the law’s development came largely to an 
end. Furthermore, already Augustus had tried to link influential iuris consulti with his political 
administration91. They became high officials within the governmental system92; since the end 
of the second century AD, leading jurists were normally paid as public servants93. At this 
time, the emperor’s legal office had become the centre of the legal system, which was increas-
ingly seen as a homogenous body of norms, backed by the emperor’s authority94. Thereafter, 
the law was developed by the emperor’s constitutiones and rescripta. Even if these were writ-
ten by professional lawyers as a matter of course, the law was now dominated by the em-
peror’s governmental system.  
 The distinction between public and private law has been formulated already by Roman 
lawyers95. However, this distinction was neither factually nor conceptually clearly drawn – 
partly for the lack of the idea of a state that could represent the “public” side96, partly because 
there was no developed administration, and partly because many of the functions of legal sys-
tems that are today understood as public responsibilities were fulfilled by private individuals. 
Thus, magistrates would proceed against crimes only if they regarded these as a threat to the 
populus Romanus as a whole; with crimes against individuals, the victims themselves had to 
initiate legal proceedings against the wrongdoer97. Furthermore, many proceedings were 
characterised by a mix of public and private interests; this was true not only for the criminal 
iudicia publica, “public” proceedings, initiated and partly controlled by private individuals98, 
but likewise for the primarily “private” actio de deiectis vel effusis, which was regarded as an 
actio popularis if a man had been killed99. And the actions against governors who unlawfully 
exploited their provinces were step by step transformed from private actions into predomi-
                                                 
91 Fögen 200 ff., further references within. 
92 Schulz 121 ff.; thus, Julian, one of the most famous Roman lawyers, passed through a long, successful career 
as public servant; he was decemvir litibus iudicandis, quaestor, tribunus plebis, praetor, and consul. As Praefec-
tus aerarii Saturni and militaris he was in charge of the public finances; later he became governor of Germania 
inferior, of Hispania citerior and of Africa; see Kunkel, Herkunft (N. 90) 157 ff. Of course, he was also member 
of the emperor’s consilium, where the emperor was advised on the most important political decisions. 
93 Kunkel, Herkunft (N. 90) 290 ff. 
94 Kaser, Privatrecht II2 (N. 74) 53 f. 
95 Ulpian, D. 1,1,2; Inst. 1,1,4; cf. Max Kaser, “Ius publicum” und “ius privatum”: Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung 
für Rechtsgeschichte/Romanistische Abteilung 103 (1986) 1 ff.; Wieacker, Röm. Rechtsgeschichte 492 f., both 
with further references. 
96 Cf. J. Walter Jones, Historical Introduction to the Theory of Law (1940) 141, 145 ff. 
97 Cf. Bernado Santalucia, Diritto e processo penale nell’antica Roma (1989) 37 ff.; Andrew M. Riggsby, Crime and 
Community in Ciceronian Rome (1999) 151 ff., 157 ff.; Jansen 198 ff. 
98 Arnold H.M. Jones, The Criminal Courts of the Roman Republic and Principate, with a Preface by John Crook 
(1972) 46, 63 ff.; Jansen 227 ff. 
99 Supra at NN. 85 ff., 88. 
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nantly public criminal proceedings100. Accordingly, it appears that Roman magistrates and 
politicians never developed a feeling that public interests should be pursued only by means of 
public law – in fact, there was no administration that could have fulfilled such duties. Instead, 
the government acted on the basis of an instrumentalist conception of private law as a matter 
of course. The aedilitian remedies, the actio de deiectis vel effusis, or the senatus consultum 
Vellaeanum are telling examples of such a view of private law101; and Augustus is famous for 
his use of matrimonial law for population policy102. Papinian, one of the last “classical” ju-
rists, even taught that the reasons for magistrates to intervene into the ius civile were always 
based on public policy103. Yet, this was only shortly before the utilitas publica, a principle of 
public utility, eroded all individual liberty or property and became the guiding measure of all 
law under the absolutistic, personal domination of the late emperors104. 
 Instrumental considerations of this sort had usually not been present in the work of the 
private iuris consulti of republican times; for them, “utilitas” normally referred to individual 
utility105. Indeed, until the second half of the second century AD, when the legal profession 
became part of the administration, these jurists had very little interest in matters of public 
law106. Apparently, they proceeded from the intuitive assumption that the law concerned the 
individual interests of Roman citizens. Thus, they tried to integrate the results of the govern-
ment’s instrumental interventions into the traditional body of law; the aedilitian remedies107 
or the treatment of the senatus consultum Vellaeanum108 are illuminating examples109. If such 
                                                 
100 Wolfgang Kunkel, Untersuchungen zur Entwicklung des römischen Kriminalverfahrens in vorsullanischer Zeit 
(1962) 61 f.; Jones, Criminal Courts (N. 98) 48 ff., 63 ff. 
101 Supra NN. 83 ff. 
102 Kaser, Privatrecht I (N. 71) 318 ff.; these laws included not only prohibitions of certain marriages, but also 
imposed duties on the Roman population to marry and have children. 
103 Papinian, D. 1,1,7,1: “ius praetorium est, quod praetores introduxerunt adiuvandi vel supplendi vel corrigendi 
iuris civilis gratia propter utilitatem publicam”. Such arguments appear already in the writings of Julian (ca. 100-
170 AD); cf. D. 9,2,51,2, where he reinterprets the old rule of cumulative liability of joint tortfeasors, which 
originally was based on a corrective-justice argument of fair retaliation (Jansen 209), as being based on the pub-
lic policy of punishing all wrongdoers. 
104 Kaser, Privatrecht II2 (N. 74) 14, 263 ff. 
105 Thus, the individual “utility” of a contract, i.e. the question of whether a parties received a quid pro quo for 
performing its duty or not, was relevant for the standard of care; cf. Dietrich Nörr, Die Entwicklung des 
Utilitätsgedankens im römischen Haftungsrecht: Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechts-
geschichte/Romanistische Abteilung 73 (1956) 68 ff.; Zimmermann, Obligations 198 f. And under the negotiorum 
gestio a likewise individual requirement of administering the affairs “utiliter” was necessary for recovering ex-
penses: Ulpian, D. 3,5,9,1. See Zimmermann, Obligations 442; Hans Hermann Seiler, Der Tatbestand der nego-
tiorum gestio im römischen Recht (1968) 51 ff., 109 f., 302; most recently Giovanni Finazzi, Ricerche in Tema 
di Negotiorum Gestio, vol. II/1 (2003) 515 ff.  
106 Cf. Schulz 54 ff., 106 ff., 164 f. 
107 Supra at NN. 83 f. 
108 Supra N. 79. The iuris consulti could interpret this senatus consultum broadly on the basis of an assumed 
purpose to protect women; thus it was applied to all situations where a woman was endangered to bind herself 
too readily for others; on the other hand, they would, despite the wording of the senatus consultum, not apply it, 
where such danger was absent; cf. Zimmermann, Obligations 148 ff., 705. 
109 Negotiorum gestio is another highly instructive example for this approach to private law. Today, negotiorum 
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integration was not possible, the iuris consulti treated governmental commands as exceptions 
based on some irregular consideration of public policy and binding only because of the magis-
trate’s or Emperor’s authority110. However, one would probably search in vain for explicit 
statements in this respect; Roman private law was never based on anything like an elaborated 
theory of corrective justice. Thus, it is still an open question, whether the lawyers’ abstraction 
from public concerns was necessary for private law to become autonomous from governmen-
tal domination, or whether the concern for private interests and the sociological-institutional 
autonomy of this lawyer’s law were parallel only by historical chance. 
 
2. A Plural Legal World? 
 
Although Roman law was based on a plural system of independent legal sources, from a pro-
cedural point of view, it was unified. As long as the praetor controlled the administration of 
justice, a choice between different courts was excluded as a matter of principle. Likewise, 
when the cognitio extra ordinem was later introduced as a procedure to acknowledge actions 
that were regarded as desirable but that would have been refused by the praetor, this introduc-
tion did not really create two independent systems of private law. Rather, in the cognitio extra 
ordinem the sovereign emperor was seen as modifying and further developing the republican 
state of the law111; the introduction of the new procedure signified a shift of the legal system’s 
centre of authority from the praetor to the emperor. 
 In sharp contrast to such a model of a coherent legal system, legal historians have 
drawn a totally different picture of the European legal order between the 12th and the 16th cen-
tury112 – a legal order said to bear significant similarities to the increasingly plural legal world 
of our times that is characterised by conflicts between independent courts applying different 
                                                                                                                                                        
gestio is often understood instrumentally as a motivation for altruistic behaviour; cf. Jeroen Kortmann, Altruism 
in Private Law (2005) 91 ff., 99 ff. Although this understanding can be traced back to Justinian’s Institutes 
(3,27,1), the classical Roman lawyers did not think so. For them, the negotiorum gestio did not more than to ac-
knowledge existing pre-legal social duties to help one’s friends (“officia amici”). Thus, there is no parallel to 
Justinian’s formulation in the Institutes of Gaius; such an instrumental understanding was apparently not ade-
quate before the private law had lost large parts of its autonomy. Cf., in more detail, Jansen, in: 
Mathias Schmoeckel/Joachim Rückert/Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), Historisch-kritischer Kommentar zum 
BGB, vol. III (to appear 2007) §§ 677-687, n. 9. 
110 Paulus, D. 1,3,16: “Ius singulare est, quod contra tenorem rationis propter aliquam utilitatem auctoritate cons-
tituentium introductum est”. Correspondingly, such provisions were to be interpreted narrowly: id., D. 1,3,14; 
50,17,141 pr.  
111 Max Kaser/Karl Hackl, Das Römische Zivilprozeßrecht2 (1996) 435 ff. 
112 This is a central thesis in Berman 10 f., 199-519; similarly Paolo Grossi, L’ordine giuridico medievale (1996) 
223 ff.; cf. also, for the 16th and 17th century, Peter Oestmann, Rechtsvielfalt vor Gericht (2002), who focuses, 
however, on the special problems of secular law in the Holy Roman Empire that resulted from tensions between 
different – written and unwritten – local laws and the ius commune. 
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legal rules and principles113. Instead of a unified legal system, it is said, the old European or-
der was a plurality of legal systems that conflicted with each other. Every individual was sub-
ject to the local statutes of the city or to the customs of the place where he lived; as far as pri-
vate law was concerned, these local laws were embedded into the increasingly universal ius 
commune114. At the same time, everybody was subject also to universal Canon law. The 
Catholic Church claimed extensive general jurisdiction for all causae spirituales, matters then 
regarded as inherently “spiritual”, such as family law (because marriage was a sacrament), the 
law of succession, and even contract law (because contracts were typically confirmed by 
oaths and the church claimed jurisdiction over pledges of faith)115. Furthermore, noblemen 
were subject to feudal law, and peasants were subject to manorial law. Many artisans had to 
obey to the local statutes and customs of their guilds, and merchants did their business accord-
ing to a supposedly universal “lex mercatoria”. 
 Yet the degree of this pluralism should not be overestimated. Feudal law was quite 
early integrated by legal scholars into the ius commune116. The most important source were 
the Lombard libri feudorum of the 11th and 12th centuries that combined a restatement of cus-
tomary feudal law with some important imperial enactments117. At the beginning of the 13th 
century, this text had been included into Justinian’s Novels and thus became a part of the cor-
pus iuris civilis. At the same time, feudal rights were explained in terms of quasi-Roman 
property law (dominium directum and dominium utile)118. Thus, at least at this time, feudal 
law could no longer be regarded as an independent legal system. Likewise, the guild’s statutes 
were easily integrated into the legal systems of cities. What is more, the different local and 
                                                 
113 Cf., for the European Union, Massimo La Torre, Legal Pluralism as Evolutionary Achievement of Commu-
nity Law: Ratio Juris 12 (1999) 182 ff. The concept of “legal pluralism” was originally coined for describing the 
legal world of former colonies, where European states had imposed their law besides the traditional customary 
order. For a survey of the debate about this concept, which has no homogenous, technical meaning, see 
Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism: Law and Society Review 22 (1988) 869 ff.; Franz von Benda-Beckmann, 
Who’s Afraid of Legal Pluralism?: Journal of Legal Pluralism 47 (2002) 37 ff.; Michaels 1221 ff., 1250 ff., all 
with further references. 
114 Wieacker, Privatrechtsgeschichte esp. 80 ff., 124 ff.; see also Karl Kroeschell, Universales und partikulares 
Recht in der europäischen Rechtsgeschichte, in: id./Albrecht Cordes (eds), Vom nationalen zum transnationalen 
Recht (1995) 265, 270 ff. 
115 Richard H. Helmholz, The Spirit of Classical Canon Law (1996) 145 ff.; more generally on the ecclesiastical 
courts’ broad jurisdiction loc. cit., 116 ff.; Berman 221 ff.; Winfried Trusen, Die gelehrte Gerichtsbarkeit der 
Kirche, in: Helmut Coing (ed.), Handbuch der Quellen und Literatur der neueren Privatrechtsgeschichte, vol. I 
(1973) 467, 485 f. 
116 Coing 36, 349 f.; see also Charles Donahue, Comparative Law Before the Code Napoléon, in: Handbook of 
Comparative Law (N. 47), 1, 10 f. 
117 Gerhard Dilcher, Libri Feudorum, in: Handwörterbuch zur deutschen Rechtsgeschichte, vol. II (1978) 
cols. 1995 ff. 
118 See Robert Feenstra, Dominium utile est chimaera: Nouvelles réflexions sur le concept de propriété dans le 
droit savant: Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 66 (1998) 381 ff.; id., Dominium and ius in re aliena: The Ori-
gins of a Civil Law Distinction, in: Peter Birks (ed.), New Perspectives in the Roman Law of Property, Essays for 
Barry Nicholas (1989) 111, 112 ff.; cf. also Maximiliane Kriechbaum, Actio, ius und dominium in den Rechtslehren 
des 13. und 14. Jahrhunderts (1996) 328 ff., 335 ff. 
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territorial laws – customary or written – were expressions of the complex political order; their 
relation was thus determined on a quasi-constitutional basis and by means of the theory of 
statutes, a predecessor of modern private international law119. Accordingly, as long as claims 
to jurisdiction were not politically contested, the multiplicity of legal sources did not neces-
sarily result in genuine conflicts in the sense that independent courts would claim jurisdiction 
for the same cases and apply different laws with divergent results. Thus, it might be mislead-
ing to describe this legal world in terms of a genuine pluralism of conflicting, independent le-
gal systems; at least in theory120, it bore perhaps more similarity to an integrated federal sys-
tem. 
By contrast, the relation between Canon law and secular laws was far more com-
plex121. Apart from jurisdiction over causae spirituales, there was a broad range of other 
bases for the church’s jurisdiction122. In particular, the church claimed broad jurisdiction ra-
tione personarum – not only over clerics, but also for travellers, members of universities, 
Jews in disputes with Christians, and for miserabiles personae, such as children or widows123. 
Attempts to clearly limit the provinces of Canon and secular law proved not very success-
ful124; in fact, quite often, even in criminal law, a matter was regarded as falling into a “mixed 
forum”, a jurisdiction of both secular and ecclesiastical courts. Such cases might be decided 
simply by the first court into which it was brought125. Additionally, however, the church also 
claimed jurisdiction ex defectu iuris. Appeal against a secular court to an ecclesiastical court 
was allowed if the secular judges had violated principles of justice126. Thus, genuine conflicts 
of jurisdiction must have become a daily experience, and not only in unusual, international, or 
politically contested cases. 
 In addition, even secular law exhibited a genuinely plural structure—at least if claims 
that a lex mercatoria existed as an independent transnational system of commercial law are 
                                                 
119 See Coing 138 ff.; Reinhard Zimmermann, Statuta sunt stricte interpretanda?: Cambridge L.J. 56 (1997) 
315 ff., both with further references. 
120 Reality, however, was much more complex; it was characterised by an extreme uncertainty about the applica-
ble law; see (for a slightly later period), Oestmann, Rechtsvielfalt (N. 112) further references within. 
121 Peter Landau, Der Einfluß des kanonischen Rechts auf die europäische Rechtskultur, in: Reiner Schulze (ed.), 
Europäische Rechts- und Verfassungsgeschichte (1991) 39, 40 f. It is true that especially the Glossators empha-
sised the unity of their legal system as based on natural law and ultimately on the unity of the Roman-Christian 
European civilisation. Thus, it may be said that they proceeded from a “unified” concept of law: Udo Wolter, Ius 
canonicum in iure civili. Studien zur Rechtquellenlehre in der neueren Privatrechtsgeschichte (1975) 23 f.; cf. 
also Jan Schröder, Recht als Wissenschaft (2001) 21 f. Nevertheless, in reality canon and civil existed as two 
different bodies of law, based on different policies that were administered by independent judicial systems. Unity 
was more an intellectual ideal than a correct description of reality. 
122 For jurisdiction ratione contractus and because of prorogation, see Trusen, Gerichtsbarkeit (N. 115) 486 f.  
123 Trusen, Gerichtsbarkeit (N. 115) 483 ff. 
124 Wolter, Ius canonicum (N. 121) 27 ff., 37 ff., 91 ff. 
125 Helmholz, Canon Law (N. 115) 117 ff. 
126 Trusen, Gerichtsbarkeit (N. 115) 487; Helmholz, Canon Law (N. 115) 119 f. 
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true. Yet, despite some treatises on a “lex Mercatoria” between the 13th and the 17th centuri-
es127, whether such a system in fact existed is strongly disputed128. The dispute is perhaps less 
the historical matters of fact, however, than to their conceptually correct interpretation. In the 
late middle ages, commercial cases normally fell into the jurisdiction of commercial courts. 
These courts consisted typically of merchants, not professionally educated lawyers, and they 
were largely, though not fully, independent of governmental or ecclesiastical control129. The 
procedure displayed few formalities130; and it was assumed that mercantile customs deter-
mined the relations between merchants131: Mercantile law was “thought to come from the 
                                                 
127 The earliest treatise of an unknown author, entitled “Lex mercatoria”, which dates from around 1280, is ac-
cessible, inter alia, in Mary E. Basile et al. (eds), Lex Mercatoria and Legal Pluralism (1998); for a later text see 
Gerard Malynes, Consuetudo, vel Lex Mercatoria or The Ancient Law-Merchant (London 1622). Neither of 
these treatises can easily be taken as evidence for the existence of a law merchant, since both were written as po-
litical arguments favouring such a law merchant. Nevertheless, both treatises may be taken as an indication that 
at least some merchants and lawyers advocated commercial customs that should be understood as a basis for a 
transnational commercial law which would be largely independent of governmental control. 
128 The existence of a medieval law merchant, similar to the modern lex mercatoria, is assumed by Schmitthoff, 
Commercial Law (N. 43) 2 ff.; Hansjörg Pohlmann, Die Quellen des Handelsrechts, in: Handbuch I (N. 115) 
801 ff., 810 ff.; Kroeschell, Universales und partikulares Recht (N. 114) 273; Coing 519; Berman 333 ff.; 
Grossi, L’ordine giuridico (N. 112) 225; on specific procedures before the courts of merchants see also 
Vito Piergiovanni, Diritto e giustizia mercantile a Genova nel XV secolo: I consilia di Bartolomeo Bosco, in: 
Ingrid Baumgärtner (ed.), Consilia im späten Mittelalter (1995) 65 ff. These views are criticised especially by 
John H. Baker, The Law Merchant and the Common Law before 1700: Cambridge L.J. 38 (1979) 295 ff.; 
Albrecht Cordes, Auf der Suche nach der Rechtswirklichkeit der mittelalterlichen Lex mercatoria: Zeitschrift der 
Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte/Germanistische Abteilung 118 (2001) 168 ff. (English translation in 
Piergiovanni [ed.], From lex mercatoria to Commercial Law [N. 25], 53 ff.: The search for a medieval Lex mer-
catoria); Charles Donahue, Benvenuto Stracca’s De Mercatura: Was There a Lex mercatoria in Sixteenth-
Century Italy? in: Piergiovanni (ed.), loc. cit., 69 ff.; cf. also the other contribution to that volume. An illuminat-
ing overview to the debate from the 13th century until the first half of the 20th century, with all its political impli-
cations, is presented by Mary E. Basile et al., Introduction, in: ead. et al. (eds), Lex mercatoria (N. 127) 13, 
20 ff., 123 ff., further references within. For an economic-functional comparison of medieval mercantile law and 
the modern lex mercatoria, see Oliver Volckart/Antje Mangels, Are the Roots of the Modern Lex Mercatoria 
Really Medieval?: Southern Economic Journal 56 (1999) 427 ff. 
129 Cf. Wilhelm Endemann, Beiträge zur Kenntnis des Handelsrechts im Mittelalter: Zeitschrift für das gesamte 
Handelsrecht 1862, 333, 355 ff.; Julius Creizenach, Das Wesen und Wirken der Handelsgerichte und ihre 
Competenz (Erlangen 1861) 15 ff.; Wilhelm Silberschmidt, Die Entstehung des deutschen Handelsgerichts 
(Leipzig 1894) 26 ff.; for Italy, more specifically, loc. cit., 4 ff. (courts of consules mercatorum, elected by the 
guilds of merchants); for England and Germany loc. cit., 18 ff., 23 ff. (courts consisting of elected aldermen, 
sometimes also of some representatives of government); Bogdan Duschkow-Kessiakoff, Das Handelsgericht. Ein 
Beitrag zu Geschichte, Wesen und Wirkung der Handelsgerichte (Diss. Greifswald, 1912) 18 ff.; Berman 345 f. 
But see Baker, Law Merchant (N. 128) 300 ff., who argues that the mercantile cases could always be brought be-
fore common law courts, even if merchants normally preferred the local courts of merchant. There is remarkably 
little modern literature about the early history of the courts of merchants; see, for an exception, Stephen E. Sachs, 
From St. Ives to Cyberspace: The Modern Distortion of the Medieval ‘Law Merchant’: American University In-
ternational L.R. 21 (2006) xxx. At the end of the 19th century, commercial courts were by definition public 
courts, established by government; arbitration or an autonomous system was by definition something else (cf. 
Silberschmidt, loc. cit., 1 f.). Accordingly, German contemporary authors typically ask, why “lay” judges had 
become part of the public courts and thus initiate there studies at a time, when the courts were already within the 
control of government; cf. Friedrich Merzbacher, Geschichte und Rechtsstellung des Handelsrichters (1979), 
who begins with a privilege of emperor Maximilian I of 1504; Dorothea Schön, Die Handelsgerichtsbarkeit im 
19. Jahrhundert unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Rheinlands (Diss. Bonn, 1999). 
130 Lex mercatoria (N. 127) ch. 1 f. and passim; see also Endemann, Beiträge (N. 129) 362 ff., 383 ff.; Knut 
W. Nörr, Procedure in Mercantile Matters. Some Comparative Aspects, in: Vito Piergiovanni (ed.), The Courts 
and the Development of Commercial Law (1987) 195, 197 ff. 
131 Endemann, Beiträge (N. 129) 347 ff. 
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market”132. But of course this did not mean that all relevant common and local law was ex-
cluded. To the contrary: The ius commune was normally the basis for decisions of the courts 
of merchants; the common law was described as the “mother of mercantile law”133. Neverthe-
less, the ius commune was routinely modified according to the merchants’ needs; this is at 
least how the learned lawyers perceived the matter134. A suitable device for achieving the de-
sired results was the idea of mercantile equity (aequitas mercatoria), allowing exceptions to 
the strict law135. Thus, in deviation from the Roman ius commune, merchants were not al-
lowed to raise the exceptio nudi pacti, according to which a “naked”, unwritten, agreement 
could not be enforced before a court136. Furthermore, in addition to different local and inter-
national customs and to the common law or ius commune, mercantile law was determined by 
numerous written local sources: statutes of the guilds and towns, on both procedure and sub-
stantive law, and by privileges of towns or princes granting special rights to marketplaces and 
to travelling merchants137. 
 Such findings are open to interpretation and debate: Did mercantile courts decide on 
the basis of “law”, or was it just “equity”, based on customs?138 What would have trans-
formed commercial customs into genuine law? The modern answer, acknowledgement or in-
corporation by the state139, was not available because, even conceptually, there was no legal 
monopoly before the modern state created one. For such customs to be regarded as law, would 
it be enough for there to have been an acknowledgement that typical forms of contracts were 
valid and could be used for interpreting incomplete agreements? Or would it rather be neces-
sary that specific forms or contents of contracts were regarded as obligatory140? Parallels to 
discussion about a modern “lex mercatoria”141 are apparent. By contrast, another alleged 
property of a modern lex mercatoria – its transnational character (i.e., absent “nations” in the 
                                                 
132 Lex mercatoria (N. 127) ch. 1. 
133 Lex mercatoria (N. 127) ch. 9. For a more detailed analysis of the complex relation between common and 
mercantile law, see Basile et al., Introduction (N. 128) 23 ff., further references within. 
134 Cf. Donahue, Benvenuto Stracca’s De Mercatura (N. 128) 109 ff. 
135 Charles Donahue, Equity in the Courts of Merchants: Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 72 (2004) 1 ff.; id., 
Benvenuto Stracca’s De Mercatura (N. 128) 84 ff.; Pohlmann, Quellen des Handelsrechts (N. 128) 801, 813. 
This idea remained vivid, when the commercial courts had come under governmental control; see the references 
in Donahue, loc. cit., to Stracca, who wrote in the 16th century; Andreas Gail, Practicarum Observationum tam 
ad processum iudiciarium, praesertim Imperialis Camerae … libri duo (Cologne 1668) lib. II, obs. XXVII, n. 27. 
136 See, in more detail, Donahue, Equity (N. 135) 4, 23 ff., further references within. 
137 Cf. Claudia Seiring, Fremde in der Stadt (1300-1800). Die Rechtsstellung Auswärtiger in mittelalterlichen 
und neuzeitlichen Quellen der deutschsprachigen Schweiz (1999) 39 ff. 
138 See the dissent in Pillans v. Van Mierop, (1765) 97 E.R. 1035, 1041 (K.B.). 
139 Cf. Michaels 1231 ff. 
140 This is apparently what Cordes presupposes when he argues that there was no lex mercatoria: Rechtswirk-
lichkeit (N. 128) 179. But this appears to leave no room for dispositive law. See also Michaels, Systemfragen des 
Schuldrechts, in: Historisch-kritischer Kommentar (N. 109) vol. II (2007) before § 241, n. 59. 
141 Cf. G. Teubner, Globale Bukowina (N. 44) 265 ff.; H.-J. Mertens, Nichtlegislatorische 
Rechtsvereinheitlichung (N. 43); Stein, Lex mercatoria (N. 43) 187 ff.; Michaels 1224 ff., 1231 f., all with 
further references. 
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modern sense, its independence of local polities) – finds no real parallel in history. If “trans-
national law” refers to a legal norms applied everywhere in the world, then mercantile law 
was no such transnational law, since it was based primarily on the local customs and privi-
leges of towns and fairs. Any “transnational” character consisted in a basic intellectual and 
normative similarity, a similarity grounded in a common understanding of what commerce 
was about and what was regarded as fair trade. 
 A final and perhaps more important question concerns the ambiguous idea of “inde-
pendence” of legal systems. If independence presupposes an autonomous Grundnorm or a 
“rule of recognition”142 for the legal system in question, it becomes difficult to clearly classify 
the lex mercatoria as “independent”, given the difficulty to situate its normative basis in the 
market or in the common law. If, alternatively, independence presupposes that the relevant 
norms, customs, and concepts constitute a complete “body of law” that is  intellectually and 
normatively independent of other legal systems and of non-legal systems of norms and belief, 
lex mercatoria does not qualify, since it was based largely on the common law. If, finally, 
“independence” is based on differences in substance, then not even Canon law would have 
constituted an independent legal system, since it has always been assumed that Canon law 
was based on the Roman ius commune (“Ecclesia vivit iure Romana”)143 and on Christian 
truth. 
Apparently, “autonomy” and “independence” are classificatory alternatives; a legal 
system is either independent or part of a wider system. Such an alternative might be insuffi-
cient or even misleading for understanding the late medieval legal order; perhaps it is more 
appropriate to describe legal (sub)systems as more or less independent viz. more or less inte-
grated. Then, the mercantile law might be viewed as more integrated into the ius commune 
than was Canon law, but less than feudal law. Accordingly, the late medieval legal order 
could perhaps be presented as a network of mutually connected, but not wholly integrated, 
subsystems of the law. Such a picture would raise further, highly interesting, questions about 
the concept of law and the idea of legal validity. Today, the law’s validity is typically ex-
plained monistically – integrated via the state’s authority144. In contrast, to describe medie-
val law it may be necessary to develop a genuinely plural conception of legal sources. 
How did the lawyers and other legal decisionmakers of these days manage the uncertainty re-
sulting from such relative independence of different legal subsystems? Answers to these ques-
tions may be helpful also for understanding more recent developments – not, of course, be-
                                                 
142 Cf. supra N. 3. 
143 “The Church lives according to Roman Law”; see Helmholz, Canon Law (N. 115) 17 ff.  
144 Supra at N. 5. 
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cause medieval concepts and instruments should be applied today, but because they could free 
modern lawyers from the unconscious conceptual constraints that result from later develop-
ments145. 
 
3. The “Lothar Legend”: Legal Authority and the Emperor’s Sovereignty 
 
Commercial matters have at most times been brought before specific mercantile courts, and 
merchants were typically a part of these courts. Nevertheless, since the 16th century these 
courts were increasingly controlled by governmental authorities and became a component of 
the public administration of justice146. At the same time, the mercantile law was integrated – 
as the merchants’ ius singulare – into the learned ius commune147. Thus, institutions that had 
developed among the merchants were now viewed as part of the common law. Apparently, 
this was connected with the rise of the state as the sovereign source of (all) legal validity. Yet 
it is an open question whether this integration should be interpreted as an active expansion of 
governmental domination that expressed the states’ sovereignty or rather as an internal devel-
opment within the legal system by which the actors of the law merchant themselves tried to 
ensure legal certainty. It may have been an important issue for the merchants’ quasi-legal sys-
tem to fix its boundaries from within by defining more clearly the distinction between legally 
binding norms and mere conventions. This dichotomy reappears today when proponents of a 
new lex mercatoria emphasize its autonomy from the state and the state’s laws and at the 
same time advocate the duty of the state to adopt the lex mercatoria as valid “law”148. 
 Interestingly, similar developments were apparent in other parts of the medieval legal 
world: If one had asked a jurist of the 14th century why the law merchant or the ius commune 
were valid and what this might mean, his answer would probably not have satisfied a modern 
lawyer. The jurist might have spoken of the grounds of legal authority, arguing that Canon 
law was based on the authority of the Church and the Pope149; that the municipal law of his 
city was based on specific statutes on the one hand, and on privileges granted to the city by a 
superior or mightier prince on the other; and that mercantile law was likewise based on privi-
                                                 
145 On this hermeneutic function of historical research Jansen, Brunnen der Vergangenheit (N. 64) 210 ff. 
146 See Coing 521 ff.; Merzbacher, Geschichte des Handelsrichters (N. 129).  
147 Coing 519 ff.; for an example Heinz Mohnhaupt, ‘Jura mercatorum’ durch Privilegien. Zur Entwicklung des 
Handelsrechts bei Johann Marquard (1610-1668), in: Gerhard Köbler (ed.), Festschrift Karl Kroeschell (1987) 
308 ff., 322 f. In England, such developments can be seen already at the end of the 13th century: Basile et al., In-
troduction (N. 128) 31 f. See also Lord Mansfield in Pillans v. Van Mierop, (1765) 97 E.R. 1035, 1038 (K.B.): 
“The law of merchants, and the law of the land, is the same”; for adoption in the United States, see Swift v. Ty-
son, 41 U.S. 1, 20 (1842). 
148 See Michaels 1232. 
149 Landau, Einfluß des kanonischen Rechts (N. 121) 40 f. 
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leges and custom. 
The authority of Roman law was a different matter. Medieval lawyers treated the cor-
pus iuris civilis as a “holy book”150: an eminent text containing eternal legal truth. In its re-
vealed authority, it was put on the same level as the Holy Scripture and the classical philoso-
phical texts of Plato and Aristotle (as far as these were known). Its authority resulted from an 
idealised view on the Roman Empire as the cradle of European civilisation151 and from the 
specifically juristic rationality inherent in its texts: it was “natural law historically confirmed 
and metaphysically validated”152. However, it did not follow that Roman law was generally 
applicable. At least in theory (though not always in practice153), written municipal law had 
priority, and the Roman ius commune was only of subsidiary applicability154. It was not so 
much a set of rules applied uniformly before the courts than a common academic language. 
Justinian’s Corpus iuris civilis was the authoritative textual point of reference of common ju-
ristic knowledge155. Accordingly, the validity of Roman law could not be explained on the ba-
sis of a concept of ideal, “natural” law. Natural law was a different concept; it did not refer to 
a transcendental ideal, but to a loose bundle of binding, yet not always directly applicable 
norms, such as the Decalogue156. At the same time, Roman law was also different from equity 
(aequitas). This was a further, independent source of law based, again, on a different source 
of legal authority; it has been seen in the treatment of mercantile custom157. 
What is more, even if there is apparently little historic knowledge in this respect, the 
different sources of legal authority may have been connected with different policies. Whereas 
the Roman sources largely proceeded from an implicit corrective-justice approach to private 
law158, medieval statutes were typically written for more instrumental considerations of public 
policy. Accordingly, they did not provide for a comprehensive codification, but were limited 
                                                 
150 Raoul C. van Caenegem, European Law in the Past and the Future (2002) 55. 
151 Koschaker, Europa und das römische Recht (N. 7) 69 ff. 
152 Wieacker, Privatrechtsgeschichte 48 ff., 51: “Naturrecht kraft geschichtlicher Würde und metaphysischer 
Autorität”; the translation follows Tony Weir: Franz Wieacker, A History of Private Law in Europe (1995) 32. 
153 Koschaker, Europa und das römische Recht (N. 7) 88 ff. 
154 Wieacker, Privatrechtsgeschichte 80 ff.; Coing 12 f., both with further references. 
155 See Klaus Luig, Institutionenlehrbücher des nationalen Rechts im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert: Ius Commune 3 
(1970) 64 ff.; id., Der Geltungsgrund des römischen Rechts im 18. Jahrhundert in Italien, Frankreich und 
Deutschland, in: La formazione storica del diritto moderno in Europa (Atti del terzo congresso internazionale 
della Società Italiana di Storia del Diritto), vol. II (1977); Raoul C. van Caenegem, European Law in the Past and 
the Future. Unity and Diversity over Two Milennia (2002), 1 ff., 13 ff., 22 ff.; Zimmermann, Ius Commune 
(N. 47) 8 ff.; id., Die Principles of European Contract Law als Ausdruck und Gegenstand Europäischer 
Rechtswissenschaft (2003) 17 f.: „übergreifende(r) intellektueller Einheit“: intellectual unity overarching the le-
gal plurality of these days. 
156 Cf. Berman 145 ff.; J. Schröder, Wissenschaft (N. 121) 9 ff. 
157 Supra NN. 135 f.  
158 Supra III.1. 
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to matters of particular importance for the social and commercial order of the community159. 
 Thus, quite different ideas and sources of legal authority or validity were present in the 
legal world of the late Middle Ages. It followed that the authority of legal sources could only 
be relative to that of others160. For contemporary lawyers, such a situation of uncertainty re-
sulting from plural and relative authority cannot have been satisfactory. The conflicting au-
thorities mutually qualified their respective authority161 and thus largely undermined the law’s 
claim to finally determine normative conflicts. Apparently, a source of absolute legal author-
ity was needed, a source to which all authority could be reduced; and here the idea of sover-
eign legislation, according to which all legal validity is based on the “will” of the sovereign, 
may have come into play. Modern authors usually attribute this idea of sovereign legislation 
to political writers162 who developed the concept of the modern state in the 16th and 17th cen-
turies, such as Jean Bodin163 or Thomas Hobbes164. The emerging modern state, so the story 
is told, took control over the law165, including private law, as part of its increasing immediate 
domination over all its citizens166. A similar interpretation would be that the state’s legislative 
authority was needed for solving fundamental problems of the legal system.  
 However, despite its plausibility at first sight, a couple of observations may raise some 
doubts about this interpretation. First, legislation had long before been a means of sovereign 
domination167. It is not a revolutionary thesis anymore that the Catholic Church became in 
many respects the intellectual and institutional model for the later national states: Since the 
11th century, the Popes used legislation both internally to construct the Church as a corporate 
entity and externally to dominate the Christian world. In fact, this is where the idea of chang-
                                                 
159 Cf. Zimmermann, Statuta (N. 119) 317. See also, as examples, Petra Koch, Die Statutengesetzgebung der 
Kommune Vercelli im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert (1995) 68 ff., 76 f., 99f.; Peter Lütke Westhues, Die 
Kommunalstatuten von Verona im 13. Jahrhundert (1995) 265 ff. Most statutes were drafted after a political re-
form or a fundamental political change; they thus contained provisions on the polity’s constitution and norms 
that were particular important for the city’s social structure and for its economic activities; cf. Armin Wolf, Die 
Gesetzgebung der entstehenden Stadtstaaten, in: Coing (ed.), Handbuch I (N. 115) 517, 573 ff., 606 ff. 
160 Thomas Duve, Mit der Autorität gegen die Autoritäten? Überlegungen zur heuristischen Kraft des 
Autoritätsbegriffs für die Neuere Privatrechtsgeschichte, in: Wulf Oesterreicher et al. (eds), Autorität der Form – 
Autorisierung – Institutionelle Autorität (2003) 239 ff. 
161 Duve, Autorität (N. 160) 249. 
162 See examplarily, J.W. Jones, History (N. 96) 81 ff.; J. Schröder, Wissenschaft (N. 121) 97 f.; Stephan Meder, 
Die Krise des Nationalstaates und ihre Folgen für das Kodifikationsprinzip: Juristenzeitung 2006, 477, 479 f. On 
the political-theoretical discourse about the sovereignty and the transpersonality of the state cf. Reinhard 100 ff., 
122 ff. 
163 Jean Bodin, Les Six Livres de la République (1583) 135 (liv. I, chap. VIII). Cf. van Crefeld 175 ff.; John 
W.F. Allison, A Continental Distinction in the Common Law (1996) 45 f., both with further references. 
164 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651) ch. 26, for whom the sovereign is, within the state, the only source of legal 
validity. 
165 Reinhard 281 ff. 
166 Supra N. 59. 
167 Berman 85 ff., 113 ff.; Reinhard 28, 186 f., 259 ff., 285 f.; Horst Dreier, Kanonistik und 
Konfessionalisierung – Marksteine auf dem Weg zum Staat, Juristenzeitung 2002, 1, 4 ff., further references 
within. In fact, Canon law may be considered the first modern legal system: Berman 12, 116 ff., 199 ff. 
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ing, as opposed to describing or restating, the law by means of legislation was developed168. 
City-republics with their statutes and early monarchic systems, like the Sicilian and the Eng-
lish, followed this example169. Thus, Aquinas could conceive of the law as an ordinatio, i.e. a 
sovereign’s command170, and for Baldus a statute’s validity typically depended on a sover-
eign’s “Sic volo sic iubeo”171. So the idea that the law’s validity can be found in a sovereign’s 
command cannot have been new in the 16th century. What was new was to describe the (na-
tional) state’s sovereignty in terms of unlimited legislative competence. But this was not di-
rectly relevant for the conceptions of positive law or for legal authority and validity. 
 Second, at the end of the 15th century – before there was a developed conception of the 
modern state – scholars had attributed the validity of all secular law172, and thus also the va-
lidity of the Roman ius commune, to the Emperor’s command. In 1135, so they told, Lo-
thar III of Supplinburg had prescribed the use of the recently found Digest173. Remarkably, 
this story was an ex post invention that served to legitimise the use of Roman law. The mod-
ern idea of the authority of private law’s being based on sovereign domination was in fact first 
developed by legal scholars as a fiction. Apparently, the results of this attribution were com-
plex: By constructing an ultimate source of authority outside the legal system that had long 
before become incapable of being a dominant actor in matters of private law, the attribution 
preserved the autonomy and the growing influence of the Roman ius commune, as “adminis-
tered” by legal academia. While purporting to interpret governmental commands, legal schol-
ars continued to develop the law largely independently of governmental or judicial influence. 
Yet, despite the central place of the state in modern concepts of law, neither the motives for 
this fiction nor its consequences have been fully analysed. Instead, since the 17th century, the 
controversial debates of the reception as such of Roman law174 have put this problem into the 
shadow. But the modern relation of private law to the state cannot be understood without a 
                                                 
168 See, apart from Berman, Helmut Quaritsch, Staat und Souveränität, vol. I. Die Grundlagen (1970) 132 ff.; 
Landau, Einfluß des kanonischen Rechts (N. 121) 45 ff.; Dreier, Kanonistik und Konfessionalisierung (N. 167) 
5, further references within. Bonifaz VIII expressly announced his Liber sextus as “new law”. 
169 Cf. Reinhard 35 ff., 60 f., 64, 67 f., 244 ff., 291 ff.; Csaba Varga, Codification as a Socio-Historical Phe-
nomenon (1991) 61. 
170 Aquinas, Summa theologica II 1, qu. 90, art. 1 und 4: “[Lex] nihil est aliud quam quaedam rationis ordinatio 
ad bonum commune, ab eo qui curam communitatis habet, promulgata”; cf. also qu. 91, art. 1; qu. 95, art. 2; 
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and the prohibition on retroactive law became a fundamental principle of Canon law. 
171 “(S)tatuta terrarum … maiori parte magis consistunt [in] sic volo sic iubeo … (thus I want and thus I 
command)”: Baldus, Super usibus feudalibus, as quoted in Helmut Coing, Zur Romanistischen Auslegung von 
Rezeptionsgesetzen: Fichards Noten zur Frankfurter Reformation von 1509: Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für 
Rechtsgeschichte/Romanistische Abteilung 56 (1936) 264, 269. 
172 Detailed Hermann Krause, Kaiserrecht und Rezeption (1952) 126 ff. 
173 Wieacker, Privatrechtsgeschichte 145; Klaus Luig, Conring, das deutsche Recht und die Rechtsgeschichte, in: 
Michael Stolleis (ed.), H. Conring (1606-1681). Beiträge zu Leben und Werk (1983) 355, 357 f., 372 f. 
174 Peter Bender, Die Rezeption des römischen Rechts im Urteil der deutschen Rechtswissenschaft (1979); 
Wieacker, Privatrechtsgeschichte 124 ff. 
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clear picture of the factors that led to the idea that legal validity could derive only from exter-
nal domination and thus from the sovereign, the ultimate secular authority. 
 Finally, even in the 16th and 17th centuries, the sovereign monarchs or cities did not 
exhibit a particular interest in comprehensively determining the law. True, they had reduced 
the impact of Canon law and had monopolised the judiciary175. And an increasing number of 
statutes was issued regulating matters of public policy176. But this legislation concerned 
mostly matters of public law177; and – apart from criminal law178 – there was no comprehen-
sive, codificatory legislation until the 18th century179. Private law continued to be based on the 
Roman texts of the ius commune and on local statutes. Thus, the appearance of the state was 
arguably irrelevant for the substance of private law and even preserved the private law’s 
autonomy. 
 
4. Sovereignty and Validity I: Codification and the State 
 
Over the course of the 17th century, the validity of the law had become a fundamental problem 
for the legal system. On the one hand, the story of Emperor Lothar III’s having enacted the 
Digest as positive law was irrelevant outside the borders of the German Empire. In 1643 it 
was buried as a “legend” in Germany as well, when Hermann Conring published his book 
“De origine iuris germanici”. On the other hand, the validity of the applicable “positive” law 
was now becoming more and more closely connected with a sovereign’s will. In the 18th cen-
tury, even customary law was reconceptualized as law tacitly agreed on, and thereby made 
valid, by the sovereign180. This led to the paradoxical and unsatisfactory situation that al-
though the validity of law could depend only on the sovereign’s command, the most important 
                                                 
175 Reinhard 281, 291 ff. 
176 Reinhard 298 ff. On the “Policeyordnungen” Wilhelm Ebel, Geschichte der Gesetzgebung in Deutschland 
(1958) 59 ff.; Michael Stolleis, Geschichte des öffentlichen Rechts in Deutschland, vol. I, 1600 – 1800 (1988) 
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177 For the Holy Roman Empire, see Heinz Mohnhaupt, Gesetzgebung des Reichs und Recht im Reich vom 16. 
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part of private law had never been enacted by any competent legislator. Accordingly, it be-
came difficult to justify the validity of the corpus iuris civilis on the basis of the prevailing 
conception of law as based on legislative fiat181. In fact, the Roman ius commune has been 
characterised as having been remarkably detached from the state’s governmental domina-
tion182. Nevertheless, during the 18th century, Roman law was taught as a matter of course at 
the universities; and the courts applied it pragmatically183. More theoretical authors justified it 
on the basis of totally divergent arguments, such as imperium (a prince’s tacit confirmation of 
the prevailing judicial practice), the traditional usus of Roman law, or its inherently legal 
qualities (ratio and certitudo). None of these arguments was regarded as really satisfactory by 
the jurists themselves184. 
 Moreover, Conring did not write his refutation of the Lothar Legend as a disinterested 
scholar. He fought – successfully – for the acknowledgement of a genuine German legal his-
tory and German private law185; and he even argued for a new comprehensive legal basis (a 
“codification”186) of German private law187. Thus, on the one hand, the received Roman law 
was increasingly discredited as “foreign”, and the concept of private law became, for the first 
time, intellectually connected with the idea of a nation. This idea of situating law in the nation 
was later deeply entrenched in European legal thinking, when Montesquieu published his De 
l’Esprit des lois in the 18th century, and when Savigny’s idea of the law being an emanation of 
the common “consciousness” or “spirit” of the people (Volksgeist) became a central element 
of the 19th century German Historic School. Similar ideas circulated at this time in the English 
common law. On the other hand, the writers of the later usus modernus regarded customary, 
law as a source of law, even if it was not laid down in a written text188. As a consequence, the 
question of which law was applicable became even more difficult, and legal proceedings suf-
fered from extreme uncertainty about the applicable law189. 
 It was only at this stage that European legislators appeared on the scene and actively 
                                                 
181 See, in more detail, Luig, Geltungsgrund des römischen Rechts (N. 155) 819 ff., further references within. 
182 Franz Wieacker, Aufstieg, Blüte und Krisis der Kodifikationsidee, in: Festschrift Gustav Boehmer (1954) 34, 
35. 
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extended their sovereignty into the domain of private law. On the continent, private law was, 
within a remarkably short period, comprehensively codified190. Thus, it is prima vista highly 
plausible to regard codifications as an expression of the “strong state”191. Indeed, codifica-
tions were initiated by the governmental administration and thus originated in the political 
sphere. Interestingly, they were first successful only in strong states; but the form of govern-
ment was irrespective for the codification projects: The law was codified in the still-
traditional absolutist kingdoms of Sweden (1734) and Bavaria (1756), by the more enlight-
ened Prussian King (1794) and the Austrian Emperor (1811), and by the bourgeois post-
revolutionary government of France (1804). From a conceptual point of view, by reformulat-
ing the private law as an expression of the sovereign state’s legislative intent, the law was in-
corporated into the state. 
Nevertheless, codifications have also been described as “a specific historical phe-
nomenon that originated in … legal science”192. In fact, it is remarkable that common-law 
systems have proved strongly resistant to codification193. Therefore, in order to understand the 
role of the state in the codification movement, it is necessary to look to the motives leading to 
codification that were apparently manifold and complex. The first was a mixture of pragmatic 
and theoretical considerations. The whole legal system was in need of fundamental reform 
and of a unified legislative foundation, not only because the present plural and insecure state 
of the law was highly unsatisfactory, but also because the normative status of Roman law as a 
source of positive law had become untenably awkward. This was partly due to the second fac-
tor – the (assumed) need to rationally reorder and systematise private law. In fact, in the in-
creasingly rationalistic world of 18th century, Roman law lost its previous status as legal ratio 
scripta that had long been a major rationale for its application: Reason had to be simple and 
evident for every clear mind, but Roman law and the civilian legal science were complex and 
full of apparently unnecessary controversy. Reason had to express itself in general proposi-
tions, i.e. abstract laws, but the digest was full of the subtle discussions of individual cases. 
Already in the 17th century, this had been a motive for humanist and natural-law scholars to 
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rearrange and rationalise the traditional private law into new systems of legal order194; thus, 
Leibniz had proposed an ideal codification that could logically reorder civil law195.  
What is more, rationality and the idea of a system had become the foundation of natu-
ral-law thinking. In the 17th and 18th centuries, authors like Grotius, Pufendorf, Thomasius, 
Heineccius, and Wolff had transformed the traditional Christian school of natural law into a 
secular enterprise. Assuming that moral and legal truths are accessible for human reason, they 
developed logical, conceptually structured systems of natural law on the basis of a limited 
number of basic moral principles. Thus, the systematic structure of the law had become much 
more than a device of expository convenience. It was a matter of moral principle. 
 Although these natural-law systems were not thought to be directly applicable, they 
proved highly influential in continental Europe, where they became a driving force in the 
codification movement. The idea of codifying the law appealed to enlightened princes and to 
the new bourgeoisie, and not only because such a codification would emphasize the crown’s 
sovereignty and the new state’s identity196 in the area of private law and because it would 
make the law accessible to everybody197: Another, possibly decisive, factor was apparently 
the instrumental, utilitarian character of this secular natural law, which was based on clear vi-
sions of a better, reasonable social order. Accordingly, a comprehensive and systematic reor-
ganisation of the law in a natural-law codification promised to further the common good and 
bring about a better, more enlightened society198: The natural-law codifications were ulti-
mately based on a reformative, instrumental view of private law199. Thus, they were initially 
drafted primarily not by legal elites, such as academic scholars or judges, but by philosophi-
cally and politically educated representatives of administration200. (Of course, these draftsmen 
knew a lot of positive law; the codifications would not have been comprehensible had they 
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not been based largely on traditional Roman law). Nevertheless, to trace and identify both the 
foundations and the results of this instrumental approach should provide important insights 
into the idea of codification and into the relation of private law to the state. 
 All in all, the codification idea was originally motivated by a bundle of highly diver-
gent factors. What is more, it was in the 19th and 20th centuries connected with new political 
values, especially with the democratic ideal of the law as an expression of a people’s will. It is 
doubtful, though, whether any of these moral ideals has ever been achieved: First, codifica-
tions today are not written by legislators and often not even by administrations, but by com-
missions of scholars and other legal experts. A democratic legitimization of the codification 
idea may therefore be regarded as artificial. In fact, even today the codification idea appears 
to be still connected with the natural-law intuition that the law can be “found” or “con-
structed” by abstract legal thinking (and therefore needs no democratic consent). Accordingly, 
it is reported by participants that current proposals for new “principles” of European law are 
occasionally written before the comparative research had been done201. Second, codifications 
have never made the law accessible to laymen outside the legal system. Even if the myth is 
true that every Frenchman used to carry his Code Civil with him, it is unlikely he understood 
it. In fact, already the enlightenment’s legislators proceeded from the assumption that addi-
tional instruments were needed to make the codified law known by the general public202. And 
finally, even the more reformatory codifications did not fundamentally change the law: One 
of the main aims of codification has always been to restate the law simply203; accordingly, the 
courts have mostly just continued earlier lines of jurisprudence204. The legal system has thus 
retained large parts of its autonomy. Of course, governments influence the development of 
private law by means of legislative intervention; this has been seen above with respect to the 
European Union’s directives and the Roman magistrates205. But codification has never fully 
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shifted the development of private law from judges and scholars to the government. It follows 
that – as long as the judiciary is not conceived of as one aspect of a homogenous, metaphysi-
cal state206 – private law may be seen as largely independent of the state even today, despite 
its formal incorporation into the state by means of codification. 
 This brings us back to the initial question of the relation of the state and the legal sys-
tem in the codification process. If this question is answered from a more formal perspective, it 
might appear decisive that the codifications replaced the plural legal sources of the late usus 
modernus by a single state law; the codification movement would thus be described as a proc-
ess of the states’ expanding their domination into traditionally autonomous areas of the legal 
system207. However, codification might likewise be understood as a primarily internal legal 
process by which an external source of legal validity is established without the legal system’s 
giving up its internal autonomy. Seen from this internal perspective, the state might perhaps 
not have meant much more for the legal system of the European nation state than did the Ro-
man praetor for the Roman republic208. However, the exact historical relation of internal legal 
and external political factors has not yet been sufficiently analysed. Such analysis is necessary 
not only for a complete picture of the historic development but also for understanding the re-
lation of the state and private law today. A comparison of the different developments in conti-
nental European and in the common-law world might well help with this analysis. 
 
5. Sovereignty and Validity II: the People and the Common Law 
 
Even today, the relation between the state and private law appears to be significantly closer on 
the European continent than in the common law. This may be due not least to the common 
law’s having always remained in the hands of judges who developed a high degree of inde-
pendence from the state and a strong collective professional identity. Although the courts had 
everywhere become a part of the centralised administration of the state (or, in England, of the 
crown), the judiciary had – in varying degrees – retained some sort of independence against 
the political government209. Even where the courts enjoyed no formal, constitutional inde-
pendence210, judges were able to protect individuals against absolutistic arbitrariness211. They 
                                                 
206 On the specific place of the judiciary “between” the legal system and the state, see infra III.5. 
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208 Supra III.1. 
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formed a self-recruiting professional elite and could thus develop specific values and a spe-
cific idea of law. Accordingly, they can often be placed “between” the state and the legal sys-
tem212. Thus the roles of judges on the one hand and of government on the other may be cru-
cial to the relation of private law and the state and so deserve special attention. The independ-
ence of judges – normative or factual – entails limits of governmental sovereignty213. 
 Nevertheless, to draw a simple distinction between the “codified” civil law and the un-
codified common law and to relate this distinction to the difference in the state’s position in 
private law may be too simplistic. First, it is wrong to describe the common law as intrinsi-
cally averse to codification. Civil lawyers will probably know that the concept “codification” 
was coined by Jeremy Bentham214, but there is less awareness of the many codification dis-
cussions in England, in the Commonwealth, and in the USA. The codification debate in Eng-
land is as old as that on the continent215, and from the 19th century onwards216, these discus-
sions were no less intense than those on the continent217. They resulted only exceptionally in 
civil codes, however, most notably in British India218 and in Louisiana219. Instead, there are 
different, specifically American outcomes of the codification debate, namely the restatements 
and the UCC, both of which have created a substantial degree of national uniformity and sys-
tematization of the law. In contrast to European codifications, however, the restatements were 
initiated as a non-state enterprise220 and have retained this status until today221. Thus, a com-
                                                                                                                                                        
Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit im 19. Jahrhundert, in: Jürgen Kocka (ed.), Bürgertum im 19. Jahrhundert, vol. I 
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bates in Germany, Austria and the Switzerland with those in England and especially British India.  
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220 Weiss 517 ff. 
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parison of the divergent codification processes on the European continent and in America is 
specifically helpful for understanding the relation of private law and the state. 
 Basically, the reasons offered for codification in England and America were similar to 
those in continental Europe222. It was argued that a codification would make the law more ac-
cessible and structure it in a rational way; its application would thus become efficient. Influ-
ential lawyers, especially Bentham, emphasised the function of a codification to promote so-
cial change towards a better society223. Furthermore, codes could have been seen as an ex-
pression of the American revolution; indeed, such arguments seem to have been important in 
early codification attempts in 17th century Massachusetts224. Why then, it might be asked, 
were these arguments ultimately less successful in the United States? 
 Standard answers are that codifications were regarded as unsatisfactorily inflexible; 
often the quality of a proposal was argued to be low. Common lawyers had always mistrusted 
the parliament and its legislative ability. Parliamentarians were opposed to social change. Po-
litically influential lawyers were likewise conservative, and they may have had political inter-
ests in preserving the present state of law that was the basis of their professional identity and 
livelihood225. But the inflexibility of codes has not prevented European legislators from codi-
fying the law even in the 20th century, and lawyers were no less conservative and self-
interested in civil jurisdictions than in English and American ones. Other reasons for the suc-
cess of the codification-movement on the European continent and not in the common law may 
have been more decisive. 
 A first reason is apparently that neither the English nor the American legal order was 
plural in the same degree and sense that made the peoples on the European continent suffer 
from legal uncertainty226. The differences between law and equity, between admiralty law and 
common law, were real, but probably less pressing than the differences among legal sources 
in Europe. Second, the prevailing common law was never seen as an alien, foreign system, as 
was the case with the Roman ius commune in the 17th century. In England and America, there 
was never an emotional distance from the prevailing legal system. To the contrary: Common 
lawyers identified with the common law227; and the sharp attacks against the common law by 
                                                 
222 But see W. Teubner who argues that different weights were attached to similar arguments. But this underesti-
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Bentham, the leading proponent of codification in England, may in turn have resulted in a 
fundamental distrust of the codification movement as a whole228. Interestingly, identification 
with the common law also happened in the United States, where, from around 1800, Ameri-
can common law was perceived not as a received body of alien English law, but as the cus-
tomary law of the American people229. 
 Connected with this observation is, third, the different role of judges on the European 
continent and in the common-law world that might have accounted for the different attitudes 
towards legislation. Whereas the French revolution used codification as a governmental bul-
wark to protect the people from a corrupt judiciary230, the objective in the common-law world 
was to protect the people through the courts from a corrupt government. The same desire for 
democracy and liberty may thus have turned into an argument for codification on the conti-
nent and against it in England and the United States and so ultimately provided a significant 
difference in the respective relationships between private law and the state. 
 For the present analysis, a fourth factor may be the most interesting one: The common 
law’s legal validity was always thought of as independent of the state231. This may seem 
doubtful for England, where the common law was developed by the common-law courts that 
in turn derived their authority from the King232, and the King was actively engaged in the 
law’s development by the introduction of remedies in equity by the King’s Court of Chan-
cery233. Yet, even if the common-law courts derived their authority from the King, the law 
they applied was thought to be found rather than made, and to bind the King, as well234: To 
overcome the law, the King had to resort a body of rules outside law, namely equity. 
In any event, when the United States rejected the sovereignty of the English Crown, 
the common law they received was thereby stripped of such foundation in the will of the 
(English) Crown. American lawyers apparently never felt another positive source of law was 
needed for lack of the common law’s legal authority. This is not to say questions of the law’s 
validity were not raised. To the contrary: In a remarkable historical parallel to the civilian de-
velopment235 in America in the 17th and 18th centuries, the validity of customary law was re-
lated to the sovereign’s will. Yet, as far as we know, this created neither conceptual nor prac-
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tical problems. Arguably, the reason it did not was that sovereignty was not attached to an ab-
stract state but to the American people, whose consent was seen as essential not only to the 
Constitution (“We, the People”), but also to the common law, understood as customary law 
based on consent and formulated by the courts as representatives of the people236. There was 
simply no need to introduce an abstract state; government and the legislator had no necessary 
role to play in the development of private law. When Justice Story declared, in 1842, that fed-
eral courts sitting in diversity could develop a federal common law rather than the common-
law rules of different states237, he did so based on the idea of a national (and even transna-
tional) common law (invoking ideas of lex mercatoria) that required no formal sovereign, 
whether state or federal, for its validity. It would take almost one hundred years until this idea 
of a private law grounded in neither the states nor in the federal government was found to be a 
“brooding omnipresence in the sky”238 and dismissed239. Yet even this dismissal was not so 
much a state-positivist attack against the idea that the common law derives its validity from 
society rather than from the state; it was an attack only against the idea that the relevant soci-
ety was a national or even transnational society rather than one of each individual state240. 
 This feature of the American concept of private law became particularly significant in 
the debate about the New York civil code241. Here, James Coolidge Carter, the major oppo-
nent of the code project, relied on arguments very similar to those of Savigny in opposing a 
German Civil Code at the beginning of the 19th century. Apart from criticising the code as a 
poorly drafted misrepresentation of the present law of New York, he opposed, on a more fun-
damental level, the very idea of a codification itself. Carter argued that law was “an original, 
but ever growing body of custom” that reflected “the national standard of justice” and “public 
opinion”. This was largely equivalent to Savigny’s idea of the law’s being an emanation of the 
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common “consciousness” or “spirit” of the people (Volksgeist). The only difference appears to 
have been that the Volksgeist had been expressed by scholars, while the “national standards of 
justice” were now collected in the precedents of the common law242. Yet, as Mathias Reimann 
has observed243, this idea was much more congenial with the American legal mind and its 
original common-law tradition than to the German legal culture that was based on “foreign” 
Roman law and that had long regarded the state as the legal sovereign. Thus, whereas Savigny 
ultimately limited his argument to the claim that German law was not yet ripe for codification 
(and indeed such Codification did come about later), Carter had no such grounds to qualify 
his argument, and the New York codification project ultimately failed. 
 This defeat is today regarded as a crucial event within the development of legislative 
codification in American244. A desire to authoritatively systematise and unify the law, how-
ever, has remained. It found a different expression in the restatements. As a purely private en-
terprise, these left the authority of the common law untouched. At the same time, they were 
conceptually and factually open for the law’s development. They did not claim to authorita-
tively fix the law, but, less pretentiously, to reconstruct it with an authoritative text. As result, 
it was natural for the restatements to get out of date. They are periodically reformulated and 
thereby – substantially and systematically – adapted to the changes of the law245. 
 All in all, different concepts of sovereignty are arguably one basic reason for the dif-
ferent role of the state in modern private law. Yet the idea of private law’s being based on a 
sovereign people’s will or consciousness is perhaps even more a fiction than the concept of a 
state comprehensively dominating the law. It served to defend, on the one hand, the law’s 
autonomy and, on the other hand, the interests of the elites of learned lawyers246. It is thus an 
interesting question, why, at some stage of Western legal history, a general consensus devel-
oped that the law conceptually needed some external source of authority, called sovereign. At 
any rate, the consequences of introducing such an external sovereign were complex: Concep-
tually, this amounted to a loss of the autonomy of private law. Yet, originally such an intro-
duction of a sovereign was a fiction that helped preserve the factual autonomy of private law. 
Only in more recent times, it may, perhaps ironically, have paved the way also for a factual 
loss of autonomy. As a matter of fact, in the course of the last 150 years, the state has become 
more and more active within private law; and in view of the state’s legal monopoly, it is diffi-
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cult to criticise such development. Today, legislation pervades private law in the United 
States, as well247. Only now, it appears that sovereignty over private law is shifting from the 
people to the state. 
 
6. The State, Society, and the Public/Private Distinction 
 
Modern writers reconstructing the development of the distinction between private and public 
law typically proceed from a political understanding of the public/private divide. They under-
stand the idea of an autonomous private law as representing specific liberal (or libertarian248) 
values such as individual autonomy, freedom of contract, and an absolute concept of property. 
According to this theory, the bourgeois society constituted itself against the increasingly pow-
erful state in the 18th and 19th century249. Liberal writers argued that private law was immune 
to governmental intervention; only the realm of public law was open to political decision-
making. In matters of private law, the legislator was restricted to describing a supposedly neu-
tral, apolitical “natural” law based on historically developed principles of justice250. The divi-
sion became entrenched in the legal system only as result of a certain political debate, when 
liberals sought to protect “society” against an increasingly dominant “state”251. 
 Of course, this theory is highly plausible and contains an important truth: The distinc-
tion was indeed politicized in this sense; and the earlier secular natural law had often assumed 
an instrumental understanding of private law252. Furthermore, this theory may help to explain 
the different approaches of the common and the civil law towards the public/private divide. In 
England, the bourgeois establishment had achieved participation in the government as result 
of the Glorious Revolution; it did not need a sphere of immunity against the government253. 
Indeed, whereas German thinkers traditionally conceived of the state as an independent entity 
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with abstract value in itself (Hegel)254, the Anglo-American world saw the state simply as the 
product of society without an independent being or intrinsic value255. 
 Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether this is the complete story. On the one hand, there 
may be more mundane reasons for the sharp divide in Germany, in particular the fact that dif-
ferent courts are competent for administrative and private matters. Since the 17th century, the 
state’s administrative acts had increasingly been regarded as immune to judicial review; this 
development culminated 1806, when – as result of the end of the Holy Roman Empire – indi-
viduals lost their traditional constitutional protection against local governments256. Thus the 
judicial review of administrative acts had to be newly established, leading to specific adminis-
trative courts257. This institutional separation probably entrenched the academic division of 
public and private law as fundamentally different subjects – a division that had resulted from 
the fact that, after the 16th century, the constitutional frame of the Holy Roman Empire had to 
be developed independently of the Roman sources, which continued to be the point of refer-
ence for private law258. As result, even today, it would be impossible in Germany to hold a 
chair for administrative law and torts. An academic teacher is expected to be either a public or 
a private lawyer. All in all, there are strong sociological reasons for the sharp divide between 
public and private law thinking in Germany that on the one hand put the division beyond 
question and, on the other hand, prevented private lawyers from seeing private law as a means 
of public concerns. 
 On the other hand, the thesis that politics and the state were behind the distinction is 
doubtful in view of its pedigree. The distinction was present in Roman law without a compa-
rable political implication259. Of course, the distinction had lost much of its relevance as long 
as European societies were largely feudal. Under the feudal system, the king did not directly 
dominate his people: Domination was mediated by intermediate vassals, and feudal relations 
were based on the ideals of voluntary consent and reciprocity260. These relations relied on 
principles of corrective justice; in fact, domination was legally conceived of in terms of prop-
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erty (dominium)261 and thus in notions of private law, to which the public/private distinction 
was unsuited262. The difference between an individual’s power over his possessions and the 
prince’s power over his vassals and subjects was only a matter of degree263. 
Yet these feudal structures of the European society began to vanish before the state 
and the idea of a homogenous society, as opposed to the state, appeared on the scene. As early 
as the 14th and 15th centuries, the first monarchies had developed in Sicily and in England as 
forms of direct domination between the prince and his subjects264. Apparently in response to 
these developments, it was soon generally recognised that different principles applied to such 
relations on the one hand and to relations among citizens on the other. This awareness is ap-
parent in discussions of the distinction between distributive and corrective justice. Although 
this distinction had been authoritatively stated by Aristotle and Aquinas, neither referred to 
different social relations265. As far as we know, it was only Cardinal Cajetan, a leading repre-
sentative of the late scholastic school of Salamanca, who in 1518 reconstructed this distinc-
tion as representing vertical and horizontal social relations. Whereas corrective justice guided 
the relations among citizens, principles of distributive justice were directed at a person repre-
senting the “whole” (society, or the state) distributing social benefits and burdens among its 
“parts” (citizens, or subjects). Conversely, the “parts” were guided by the principles of legal 
justice (iustitia legalis): the obligation to obey the law266. This was an expression of the intui-
tion that sovereign domination makes a fundamental difference from a normative, legal point 
of view: Different principles apply to the public and to the private sphere. Within few years, 
and before the modern concept of a state267 and the idea of a private society had been devel-
oped, this transformation of the Aristotelian doctrine had become generally accepted268, and it 
has continued to determine all future discussions and legislation269. 
                                                 
261 Supra at NN. 116 ff. The Latin “dominium” embraces both, private “property” and public “domination”: 
Wieacker, Röm. Rechtsgeschichte 376. In Roman law, by contrast, the concept of “dominium” had later been re-
stricted to the power over things and un-free persons; the power of the magistrates was more limited and con-
ceived of as “imperium”. 
262 Cf. Allison, Distinction (N. 163) 42 f., further references within. 
263 James H. Burns, Fortescue and the Political Theory of Dominium: The Historical Journal 28 (1985) 777, 778. 
264 Berman 405 ff. 
265 Aristotle, Nikomachic Ethics, 1130 b, 30 ff.; 1131 a, 16 ff. For Aquinas it was a matter of course that princi-
ples of corrective justice were guiding also the punishment of wrongs that affected the community; cf. Summa 
theologica II 1, qu. 61, art. 4: “et ideo punitur in hoc quod multiplicius restituat: quia etiam non solum damnifi-
cavit personam privatam, set rempublicam …”. 
266 Thomas Cajetan, In secundam secundae … doctoris Thomae Aquinatis … commentaria (Paris, 1519) ad II-II, 
qu. 61, art. 1; cf. John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (1980) 184 ff.; Jansen 83 ff. 
267 Supra NN. 163 f. 
268 Domingo de Soto, De iustitia et iure (1556, reprinted 1968) lib. III., qu. V., art. I, at Secundo argumento and 
Quo responsio. 
269 On the early division of statutory legislation into private and public cf. Wilhelm Brauneder, Frühneuzeitliche 
Gesetzgebung: Einzelaktionen oder Wahrung einer Gesamtrechtsordnung?, in: Gesetz und Gesetzgebung 
(N. 177) 109, 122 ff. 
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 Accordingly, although secular natural lawyers often proceeded from an instrumental 
view into private law, they clearly separated it from public law. Thus, Pufendorf, in his “De 
iure naturae et gentium” first treats private relations in the status naturalis – such as tort, con-
tract, and property law270 – then proceeds to private relations of domination271, before con-
cluding with public272 and administrative law273. Apparently he regarded the different areas of 
the law as sufficiently distinctive to deserve separate treatment. The instrumental concept of 
private law does not make its specific foundation in corrective justice irrelevant. Private li-
ability for negligence is justified on the basis of a preventive, penal consideration that will re-
appear much later in the economic analysis of law: Without such liability, citizens would not 
refrain from selfishly causing damage to each other274. But Pufendorf neither proposed an al-
ternative to the law of delict nor equated it with criminal law. 
At the same time, Pufendorf did not think that private law should be immune to public 
regulation. Many questions of private law were not finally determined by natural law and 
were therefore left to the sovereign’s discretion275. Thus, a full understanding of the idea of 
private law as autonomous against public intervention requires tracing the equating of private 
law with the (equally fundamental) intuition of Western lawyers, held by civil and common 
lawyers (albeit in different ways) that certain principles of the law are beyond governmental 
discretion276. At any rate, a full understanding of the public/private-divide will be enhanced if 
its different historical layers of normative meaning are disentangled. 
 What is more, independently of any political argument, such as defending society 
against the state, the distinction between corrective and distributive justice may be a suffi-
ciently important from a normative point of view, to retain the distinction between public and 
private law. True, private relations can never finally be determined without distributive con-
siderations of public policy277: The law of tort/delict distributively assigns protected interests 
                                                 
270 Samuel Pufendorf, De iure naturae et gentium libri octo (cum integris commentariis Io. Nic. Hertii atque Io. 
Barbeyraci, Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1759) lib. II, cap. II – lib. V. 
271 Loc. cit. (N. 270) lib. VI, where family law (De matrimonio, De patria potestate) and the domination over 
servants (De herili potestate) are treated. 
272 Loc. cit. (N. 270) lib. VII: constitutional structure of the civitas: summum imperium civilis; seu Majestatis. 
273 Loc. cit. (N. 270) lib. VIII. 
274 Loc. cit. (N. 270) lib. III, cap. I, § 2. 
275 Pufendorf, De iure naturae et gentium (N. 270) lib. VIII, cap. I, § 1. 
276 On the old, Germanic distinction of “Weistum”, describing some naturally “given” law and “Gesetz”, which 
was originally some kind of positive agreement of those affected, cf. Ebel, Gesetzgebung (N. 176) 12 ff. Roman 
lawyers clearly distinguished between civil law that was binding only for Romans and the ius gentium that was 
valid for all human beings, independently of their civitas; cf. Gaius, Institutiones, I,1: “naturalis ratio inter omnes 
homines”. Today, this intuition is presupposed by the idea of human rights binding government, or even the 
state. For a recent explanation of ius gentium, see Waldron (N. 49) 132 ff. 
277 Hanoch Dagan, The Distributive Foundation of Corrective Justice: Michigan L.R. 98 (1999) 138, 146 ff.
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and determines the extent of individual responsibility (strict liability vs. liability for fault)278. 
Contract law distributively decides for all citizens of a legal order which interests should be 
protected against other citizens. But such distributions concern bipolar relations that are nor-
matively structured by corrective justice. They are different from distributions like those of 
tax law that are independent of such bipolarity. It might therefore be too rash to discredit this 
distinction altogether as politically conservative. 
 
III. Concluding Remarks 
 
All in all, these observations show that from a historical point of view, many questions re-
garding the relation between the state and private law are still open. Much of the historical 
genesis of this relation is unknown or open to debate. At the same time, even if it is not possi-
ble to draw “conclusions” from historic analysis, these observations may shed new light on 
more basic, conceptual and normative questions that arise as result of the developments de-
scribed in the introduction. 
 
1. Sovereignty, Validity, and Authority 
 
The historical survey has shown that the idea of basing the validity of private law on some ex-
ternal sovereign was always somewhat fictional: Neither the American people nor the conti-
nental European states, as represented by governments, could ever comprehensively control 
the private law’s development. Besides government, academics and judges remained impor-
tant actors. Thus it might be  possible to conceive of legitimate private law without roots in  
external sovereignty. Indeed, basing all validity monistically in one sovereign is perhaps not 
very helpful when the law becomes transnational;279 such a concept is of limited usefor con-
flicts between different national and transnational legal systems. 
Now, private law without a state may be seen simply as a kind of natural law280. In-
deed, this idea is again present in the debate of a lex mercatoria281 and among the proponents 
of a European civil code282. Yet, for a new natural-law approach, more would be needed than 
a somewhat naïve belief in eternal legal values;  and even if the idea of natural law does not 
                                                 
278 See, on the basis of a discussion of opposing views of authors like Epstein, Coleman, Weinrib, or Ripstein, 
Jansen 90 ff. 
279 Cf. Michaels 1226; id., Privatautonomie und Privatrechtskodifikation (N. 43). 
280 Peter Jäggi, Privatrecht und Staat (1946). 
281 Dalhuisen, International Commercial Law (N. 43) 30 ff., 98 ff. 
282 Cf. supra at N. 201. 
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depend on some external sovereign283, natural law lacks the positivity which is also indispen-
sable for transnational law284. Thus, older concepts related to the pluralism of legal sources 
and authorities may be more helpful for understanding and dealing with the modern complex 
state of the law. Here, contemporary legal theory has developed different concepts of valid-
ity285 – legal validity, ethical validity, and social validity – relating them to different stand-
points: to the internal interpretative point of view, to the superior moral point of view, and to 
the external descriptive point of view286. Historical experience, however, indicates that such 
standpoints can be combined. Thus, the idea of the law’s authority may be a suitable instru-
ment for describing the difficult questions, whether transnational sources could or should be 
used for solving a legal conflict. This concept allows for degrees and for a combination of dif-
ferent standpoints. It may thus complement the monistic concept of legal validity. However, 
to make the still-vague idea of “legal authority” a useful legal instrument would require fur-
ther analysis. 
 
2. Justifying Policy: Democracy and Reason 
 
This first conceptual problem of legal validity or authority becomes more practical when 
normative questions are the object of debate. It is common knowledge today that private law 
implies far-reaching decisions of policy: Simply speaking, private law may be more or less 
liberal or social. This is seen as one of the fundamental reasons for an authoritative, govern-
mental codification of private law on the one hand287, and for challenges to the legitimacy of 
transnational, global law, on the other288. This debate presumes that government is able to de-
termine the development of private law, but history shows this presumption to be doubtful. 
Codifications are not drafted by the political legislator, and they have proved unable to deter-
mine the law’s future development. Private law has kept a significant degree of autonomy, 
even when it has been codified. Thus, to acknowledge the autonomy of transnational or judi-
                                                 
283 However, reason may be seen as the natural law’s “external” sovereign. 
284 Modern system theory and autopoietic theory may explain the law’s positivity without an external sovereign 
(Niklas Luhmann, Das Recht der Gesellschaft [1995] 98 ff.; id., Law as a Social System [1995] 122 ff.; Gun-
ther Teubner, Recht als autopoietisches System [1989] 1 ff.; id., Law as an Autopoietic System [1993]). How-
ever, autopoiesis may be better equipped to explain the law’s creation, persistence and evolution, than its legiti-
macy. 
285 See Michaels/Jansen (N. 1) IV.A., references within. 
286 Robert Alexy, Begriff und Geltung des Rechts (1992) 47 ff., 139 ff.; Michaels, Privatautonomie und 
Privatrechtskodifikation (N. 43) 611 ff. 
287 See, from different political camps, Gordon Tullock, The Case Against the Common Law (1997) 53 ff.; Ugo 
Mattei, Hard Code Now!: Global Jurist Frontiers 2 (2002) No. 1, Article 1, 
http://www.bepress.com/gj/frontiers/vol2/iss1/art1. 
288 See Michaels/Jansen (N. 1) IV.C. 
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cially made private law may in fact present fewer new problems than is commonly assumed. 
On the one hand, the states’ governments maintain the option to intervene into such law; on 
the other, if it is simply not possible to justify private-law policy by means of governmental 
representation, it may be more promising to look for adequate forms of legal reasoning, for 
transparency of decisionmaking, and for other forms of (discursive) participation of those af-
fected by a decision. Transnational discourse and consent may be seen as an adequate form of 
justification and thus as a source of legal authority and legitimacy289. 
 
3. Systematising Private Law 
 
Codifications structurally changed the nature of systematic and doctrinal legal reasoning. As 
long as the authoritative texts of a legal system do not presuppose an explicit or implicit sys-
tem, as was the case in Europe before the codifications290 and still is today in the common-
law jurisdictions291, systematic thinking may be constructive, innovative, and thus open to re-
vision. Under such conditions, systems are brought to the law “from the outside”292. More re-
cently, such an approach has been presupposed by the American restatements and by enter-
prises to formulate transnational doctrinal systems as a basis for comparative law293. As long 
as the different national systems exhibit sufficient similarities in substance, then, it may, in 
principle, be possible to formulate such systems transnationally294. 
                                                 
289 McCrudden, A Common Law of Human Rights? (N. 48) 529 ff., with a discussion of objections to such an 
idea. 
290 Supra N. 194; for the system debates of the 19th century German doctrine that ultimately determined the sys-
tem of the German Civil Code, see Andreas B. Schwarz, Zur Entstehung des modernen Pandektensystems: 
Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte/Romanistische Abteilung 42 (1921) 578 ff. 
291 For approaches to systematise the common law see Peter Birks, Definition and Division: A Meditation on In-
stitutes 3.13, in: id. (ed.), The Classification of Obligations (1997) 1 ff.; id., English Private Law, 2 vols (2000) 
esp. the introduction, xxxv ff.; Stephen Waddams, Dimensions of Private Law: Categories and Concepts in An-
glo-American Legal Reasoning (2003).; cf. also John A. Jolowicz (ed.), The Division and Classification of the 
Law (1970). For a critique of such approaches Geoffrey Samuel, System und Systemdenken – Zu den Unter-
schieden zwischen kontinentaleuropäischem Recht und Common Law: Zeitschrift für Europäisches Priva-
trecht 1995, 375 ff.; id., English Private Law: Old and New Thinking in the Taxonomy Debate: Oxford Journal 
of Legal Studies 24 (2004) 335 ff.; id. Can the Common Law Be Mapped?: University of Toronto L.J. 55 (2005) 
271 ff. 
292 Methodologically they are perhaps best understood as a reconstructive enterprise, described (for political the-
ory) as a “reflective equilibrium” by John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (rev. ed. 1999) 41 ff. For juristic theories 
see Jansen, Dogmatik, Erkenntnis und Theorie im Europäischen Privatrecht: Zeitschrift für Europäisches Priva-
trecht 2005, 750, 768 f., further references within. 
293 Cf. Ulrich Drobnig, Methodenfragen der Rechtsvergleichung im Lichte der “International Encyclopedia of 
Comparative Law”, in: Ernst von Caemmerer (ed.), Ius Privatum Gentium. Festschrift Rheinstein, vol. I (1969) 
221, 228 ff.; Mauro Bussani/Ugo Mattei, The Common Core Approach to European Private Law: Columbia 
Journal of European Law 3 (1997/98) 339 ff. These systems, however, are of a mere expository function; they do 
not aim at achieving internal, normative coherence of the legal system. 
294 Accordingly, in the times of the ius commune local laws were typically explained within the transnational sys-
tematic framework of Justinian’s Institutiones: Luig, Institutionenlehrbücher (N. 155) 64 ff. See also Michaels, 
The Functional Method of Comparative Law, in: Handbook of Comparative Law (N. 47) 339, 372 f. 
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 Systematic thinking within a codified legal order, however, aims at finding and, at 
best, developing an authoritatively imposed system within the law295; it is part of the applica-
tive hermeneutic process of interpreting a sovereign legislator’s command296. Accordingly, 
codifications tend to ossify the systematic assumption of the times of their enactment and thus 
may become an obstacle to adequately describe the law’s development over time. Although 
individual legal rules can be changed (relatively) easily by legislation or by judicial develop-
ment297, to replace a traditional legal system with a new one has proved difficult and often 
even impossible. As a natural consequence, tensions emerge between the codification’s im-
plied systematic structure and the changing values and rules. Thus, the systematic assump-
tions implicit in codifications may create serious problems for legal reasoning and for the ju-
dicial development of the law298. 
 If the law should remain responsive to such a change of values, or if such change is in-
evitable (as the history of codified law suggests)299, it may be preferable to leave the task of 
system-building to academia and limit the legal competences of democratically legitimated 
legislative bodies to normative decisionmaking. In the end, the questions of how to formulate 
doctrine and systems should be decided by more “scholarly” criteria intrinsic to the law – like 
technical precision, adequacy, and internal coherence; these criteria are largely independent of 
political authority. In this way, juristic knowledge could again become independent of na-
tional legal systems; the development of a European jurisprudence formulating “principles” of 




                                                 
295 Cf. Claus-Wilhelm Canaris, Systemdenken und Systembegriff in der Jurisprudenz2 (1983) 13 and passim. 
296 On applicative and constructive legal theories Jansen, Dogmatik (N. 292) 764 ff. 
297 Zimmermann, Codification 108 f. 
298 This has been shown in more detail for the law of delict; cf. Jansen 76 ff., 181 ff., 271 ff.; id., Duties and Rights 
in Negligence. A Comparative and Historical Perspective on the European Law of Extracontractual Liability: Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 24 (2004) 443, 447 ff.; Reinhard Zimmermann, Wege zu einem europäischen Haftungs-
recht, in: id. (ed.), Grundstrukturen des Europäischen Deliktsrechts (2003) 19, 29 f. More generally Jansen, 
Brunnen der Vergangenheit (N. 64) 210 ff., 217 ff. 
299 See, for Germany, especially the Historisch-kritischer Kommentar (N. 109); the contributions there make ap-
parent that the law’s development continued despites its codification; in fact, the German codification was only 
one step in the development of German private law. 
300 Supra at NN. 45 ff. 
301 See Michaels/Jansen (N. 1) IV.B. It would be necessary, however, to develop the adequate methodological 
instruments necessary for such an enterprise. This leads to a far range of further questions that do, however, not 
immediately concern the relation of private law and the state: Can legal principles be expressed adequately in le-
gal systems? Is the choice to systematize itself a normative the question to what extent normative decision, rep-
resenting a certain (public) policy? Is the structure of a system neutral as to its content, or does it have an impact 
on the substance, or at least its perception? How much and what kind of similarity between different legal sys-
tems would be needed for doctrinal discourse and legal knowledge that transcend single legal systems? 
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These are questions not for the past but for the present and for the future; they are questions 
central to debates of Europeanization and globalization. Yet this article has shown, on the one 
hand, that these questions are the result of a specific historical development: There is no 
“naturally given” relation between private law and the state. On the other hand, it has become 
apparent that these questions are not simply the fruit of totally new tensions between private 
law and the state, either. Similar questions have occupied the minds of lawyers for centuries. 
Accordingly, the article has shown a couple of answers given in the long and winding history 
of German and US law. Obviously, these answers cannot simply be copied; our period is dif-
ferent from those that came before it. At the same time, to ignore these debates in answering 
the questions of our time would mean to dispense with centuries of experience that we have 
with these, or similar, questions. Even more importantly, our modern questions are often not 
fully understood if they are not seen as resulting from specific, partially contingent historical 
developments. If this article has succeeded in making this historical background of the mod-
ern debates more accessible, it has served its aims. 
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